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David E. Pozen 
The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the 
Freedom of Information Act 
abstract.   This Note documents the evolution of the “mosaic theory” in Freedom of 
Information Act (FOIA) national security law and highlights its centrality in the post-9/11 
landscape of information control. After years of doctrinal stasis and practical anonymity, federal 
agencies began asserting the theory more aggressively after 9/11, thereby testing the limits of 
executive secrecy and of judicial deference. Though essentially valid, the mosaic theory has been 
applied in ways that are unfalsifiable, in tension with the text and purpose of FOIA, and 
susceptible to abuse and overbreadth. This Note therefore argues, against precedent, for greater 
judicial scrutiny of mosaic theory claims. 
author.  J.D., Yale Law School, expected 2007; M.Sc., Oxford University; B.A., Yale 
College. Thanks to the Hon. James E. Baker, Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Fadi Hanna, Kenneth Levit, 
John Sims, David Vladeck, and the Hon. Patricia M. Wald for helpful comments. Meredith 
Fuchs introduced me to the mosaic theory and, along with Harold Koh, encouraged me to 
undertake this project; their support was invaluable. I owe my deepest debt of gratitude to 
Robert Post, who provided generous and incisive guidance every step of the way.
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It requires little reflection to understand that the business of foreign 
intelligence gathering in this age of computer technology is more akin to the 
construction of a mosaic than it is to the management of a cloak and dagger 
affair. Thousands of bits and pieces of seemingly innocuous information can 
be analyzed and fitted into place to reveal with startling clarity how the unseen 
whole must operate.1 
[G]iven judges’ relative lack of expertise regarding national security and their 
inability to see the mosaic, we should not entrust to them the decision whether 
an isolated fact is sensitive enough to warrant closure.2 
introduction 
 The “mosaic theory” describes a basic precept of intelligence gathering: 
Disparate items of information, though individually of limited or no utility to 
their possessor, can take on added significance when combined with other 
items of information. Combining the items illuminates their interrelationships 
and breeds analytic synergies, so that the resulting mosaic of information is 
worth more than the sum of its parts. In the context of national security, the 
mosaic theory suggests the potential for an adversary to deduce from 
independently innocuous facts a strategic vulnerability, exploitable for 
malevolent ends. The Department of the Navy, in its Freedom of Information 
Act (FOIA) regulations, thus defines the theory as “[t]he concept that 
apparently harmless pieces of information when assembled together could 
reveal a damaging picture.”3 The relevant pieces of information might come 
from the government, other public sources, the adversary’s own sources, or any 
mixture thereof. For several decades, government agencies have invoked 
mosaic concerns to justify both classifying documents at higher levels of 
confidentiality and withholding documents requested through FOIA or 
through pretrial discovery. President Reagan drew attention to the mosaic 
theory, and prompted criticism from civil libertarians, by using it to promote 
new schemes for safeguarding information, but once he left office the theory 
quickly receded from public view. 
 
1.  Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1, 8 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
2.  N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). 
3.  32 C.F.R. § 701.31 (2005). The mosaic theory, as the Navy regulations indicate, is sometimes 
referred to as the compilation theory. Id. Both terms have been applied to areas unrelated to 
national security; this Note considers only the mosaic theory of intelligence gathering. 
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Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, the mosaic theory has 
made a comeback. If the judicial record is any indication, government agencies 
under the Bush Administration have been asserting the mosaic theory with 
greater vehemence, across a greater range of records. Courts, in turn, have 
grappled with the theory more frequently and more explicitly than ever before. 
Facing a post-9/11 national security environment of informational anxiety and 
terrorist threat, the Administration has designated FOIA a critical liability and 
narrowed its openness-forcing capacity accordingly; the aggrandizement of the 
mosaic theory, this Note will demonstrate, has been both a cause and 
consequence of the Act’s diminishment. Although not all courts have 
sanctioned this expanded role for the theory, judges in several high-profile 
cases have relied on it to sustain unprecedented acts of secrecy. In Center for 
National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice,4 for example, the D.C. 
Circuit applied the mosaic theory to uphold the Justice Department’s 
categorical denial of FOIA requests for information about more than seven 
hundred people detained in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. In North Jersey Media 
Group v. Ashcroft,5 the Third Circuit likewise applied the theory to uphold the 
government’s decision to close 9/11-related “special interest” deportation 
hearings to the public and the press. In neither case did the government proffer 
substantive evidence of likely harms from disclosure. 
Taken along with other recent cases, Center for National Security Studies and 
North Jersey Media suggest the scope of official activity now being shielded by 
the mosaic theory, as well as the degree of judicial deference routinely granted 
to agencies making mosaic claims. For courts and agencies alike, since 9/11 the 
mosaic theory has at the same time manifested, justified, and exacerbated a 
new reticence to publicize government-controlled information. In the process, 
the theory has insinuated itself into the fundamental post-9/11 debates: how to 
balance civil liberties with national security and how to structure intelligence 
policy in an age of terrorism. Despite scant attention from the media or from 
scholars,6 the mosaic theory has developed into a doctrinal tool of great force in 
national security law. 
 
4.  331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
5.  308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1056 (2003). 
6.  While the mosaic theory has been discussed in the context of specific cases or executive 
actions, it has never been taken as an independent subject, in law or any other discipline, 
and I have discovered only one other argument for the theory as a theme in post-9/11 
national security litigation beyond immigration proceedings. See Panel Discussion, 
American Constitution Society Conference, The United States, Human Rights, and 
International Law (Aug. 1, 2003), http://www.acslaw.org/pdf/Human%20Rights.pdf 
(statement of Patricia Wald, Former Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, D.C. Circuit) 
(“The government uses a kind of familiar argument . . . running through most of the 9/11 
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This Note, the first work to analyze the mosaic theory in systematic (or 
even sustained) fashion, attempts to document this development and assess its 
implications. In synthesizing the case history, I consider several interrelated 
areas of national security information law, but I focus on FOIA, where the 
mosaic theory has had greatest effect, and on the courts, where the theory’s 
boundaries are ultimately delimited. In particular, I examine the difficulties the 
theory poses for courts hearing national security cases. New terrorists and new 
technologies have increased the risks from mosaic-making in recent years, and 
the trauma of 9/11 has increased the salience of such risks. Yet while the mosaic 
theory provides an accurate description of how adversaries might capitalize on 
information disclosure, courts have—in deference to agencies’ perceived 
superiority at evaluating mosaic threats—applied it in ways that are 
unfalsifiable and deeply susceptible to abuse and overbreadth; they have 
created in the mosaic theory a latently subversive basis for withholding 
information. When courts accord heightened deference to agencies’ mosaic 
claims, moreover, they contravene the text and purpose of FOIA. As a result, I 
argue that mosaic claims deserve additional judicial scrutiny, not additional 
deference. 
 
cases; the so-called mosaic theory.”). Commentators have recognized the theory as an 
important and vexing issue in national security law, but none has ventured an analysis of 
mosaic theory history or doctrine. The most prominent critical references include DAVID 
COLE, ENEMY ALIENS: DOUBLE STANDARDS AND CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 20-21, 32-33 (2003) (assailing the Bush Administration’s use of the theory in 
post-9/11 immigration proceedings); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and 
Constitutional Consequences of Post-9/11 Policies Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United 
States: Is Alienage a Distinction Without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 652 (2005) 
(same); Robert P. Deyling, Judicial Deference and De Novo Review in Litigation over National 
Security Information Under the Freedom of Information Act, 37 VILL. L. REV. 67, 84 (1992) 
(calling the theory “[o]ne of the most serious challenges to effective judicial scrutiny of 
executive claims”); Janet Raloff, Coming: The Big Chill?, in FREEDOM AT RISK: SECRECY, 
CENSORSHIP, AND REPRESSION IN THE 1980S, at 86, 89-90 (Richard O. Curry ed., 1988) 
(summarizing the theory’s application in the Reagan Administration); Jonathan Turley, 
Through a Looking Glass Darkly: National Security and Statutory Interpretation, 53 SMU L. REV. 
205, 232 (2000) (“What made the Area 51 litigation a fascinating academic model was . . . the 
additional use of the highly controversial ‘mosaic theory’ to effectively defeat any 
enforcement of the statutory provisions.”); Keith Anderson, Note, Is There Still a “Sound 
Legal Basis?”: The Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 World, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1605, 
1641-42 (2003) (questioning the court’s application of the theory in Center for National 
Security Studies); Rashad Hussain, Policy Comment, Security with Transparency: Judicial 
Review in “Special Interest” Immigration Proceedings, 113 YALE L.J. 1333, 1335 & n.12 (2004) 
(same for North Jersey Media); and Steven J. Lepper, Note, Developments Under the Freedom of 
Information Act—1982, 1983 DUKE L.J. 390, 397-98 & n.56 (arguing that the theory gives 
FOIA an unlegislated tenth exemption). 
POZEN NOTE 120600 (POST FLIP INPUTS POST POST) 12/19/2005  6:44:51 PM 
the mosaic theory 
633 
 
The Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides an overview of FOIA’s 
relationship to national security and traces the mosaic theory’s trajectory in 
national security information law from its advent in 1972 through September 
11, 2001. Part II discusses the recent transformation of FOIA and the mosaic 
theory. Evaluating the major post-9/11 cases, I argue that the Bush 
Administration’s bolder use of the theory has unsettled mosaic theory 
jurisprudence. At issue in this emerging doctrinal division is the extent to 
which the Administration’s War on terror will be insulated from judicial 
scrutiny, as well as the future of FOIA’s national security exemption. Moving 
from positive to normative examination of judicial review of mosaic cases, Part 
III challenges the longstanding assumption that these cases make up a special 
class of FOIA appeal and critiques the delegatory tradition in mosaic theory 
review. A concluding Section sketches proposals for invigorating judicial 
oversight without endangering national security. 
i. the mosaic theory in foia law, 1972-2001  
 The mosaic theory is, essentially, a theory of informational synergy. It 
describes a process through which adversaries collect, combine, and compile 
items of information, some or even all of which are harmless in their own right. 
And it suggests an outcome whereby this process, in a feat of analytic alchemy, 
converts the harmless information into something useful. “[A]ll intelligence 
agencies,” one FOIA opinion recently noted, “collect seemingly disparate pieces 
of information [in the hope of] assembl[ing] them into a coherent picture.”7 
That is, they all make mosaics, constantly. It would be illogical, therefore, to 
make classification decisions on an item-by-item basis; instead, “[p]rotection 
through classification is required if the combination of unclassified items of 
information provides an added factor that warrants protection of the 
information taken as a whole.”8 To determine the security risk of disclosing a 
given document, the mosaic theory stipulates, one must consider the possible 
mosaics to which the document might contribute. The mosaic, not the 
document, becomes the appropriate unit of risk assessment. 
In the decades that courts have applied it to national security information 
law, this Part will show, the mosaic theory has hardly evolved past this sketch. 
Several early opinions set out a framework for the theory and a framework for 
applying it. For these courts, and for those that followed, the theory appeared 
 
7.  Berman v. CIA, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1209, 1215 (E.D. Cal. 2005) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
8.  Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434, 436 (D. Nev. 1995) (summarizing Information Security 
Oversight Office guidelines). 
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to make risk assessment more complicated—and hence to make judicial 
deference to government agencies more apposite. Beyond these principles, the 
mosaic theory has not been undertheorized in the case law or its derivative 
literature so much as it has not been theorized at all. 
To elucidate the theory’s development, this Part begins with an explanatory 
note on FOIA.9 Although the text and legislative history of the Act contemplate 
judicial deference to federal agencies, as Section A explains, Congress aimed to 
circumscribe this deference through a number of mechanisms. Nevertheless, 
the history of FOIA national security adjudication makes plain that structural 
and psychological biases give the government a great advantage, in mosaic and 
non-mosaic cases alike. Sections B and C describe how, after a triad of early 
opinions established the conceptual and rhetorical core of mosaic theory 
doctrine, it steadily gained acceptance in other courts throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s. Without ever specifying what constitutes a mosaic theory case or 
why such a case demands special treatment, these courts consistently accorded 
heightened deference to agencies’ mosaic arguments. Agencies were allowed to 
withhold information on the basis of mosaics that judges rarely, if ever, 
interrogated in detail, challenged as implausible, or attempted to segregate into 
harmful and nonharmful components. Most judges consigned the mosaic 
theory to the realm of metaphor. Even before 9/11, then, the mosaic theory had 
achieved a privileged status under FOIA, whereby courts accorded its 
government proponents especially lenient treatment. 
A. FOIA and National Security: A Brief Overview 
1. The Framework of FOIA 
Replacing the ineffectual public disclosure section of the Administrative 
Procedure Act of 1946, FOIA was the first federal statute to establish an 
enforceable right of public access to executive branch information.10 The 
“crystal clear . . . congressional objective” in promulgating FOIA, proclaimed 
the Supreme Court, was “to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and to 
open agency action to the light of public scrutiny.”11 Pursuant to FOIA, the 
 
9.  The origins and workings of FOIA, and the controversies surrounding it, have been treated 
extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
(1999); OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 
GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW (2004) [hereinafter DOJ FOIA GUIDE]. 
10.  Pub L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). 
11.  Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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government has disclosed millions of documents to requesters and proactively 
released millions more to the general public through the Federal Register, 
reading rooms, and websites. The Act has become both a powerful tool for 
inducing disclosure and a powerful symbol of America’s commitment to 
governmental transparency. 
Yet from the beginning, FOIA has been marked by compromise, as its 
underlying principles of openness and accountability often conflict with other 
societal goals, “such as the public’s interests in the effective and efficient 
operations of government . . . and in the preservation of the confidentiality of 
sensitive personal, commercial, and governmental information.”12 To negotiate 
the countervailing interests opposing its “general philosophy of full agency 
disclosure,”13 FOIA provides for nine exemptions under which agencies can 
withhold requested information.14 For national security, the most significant 
are Exemption 1, which allows agencies to withhold records in the interest of 
national defense or foreign policy, and Exemption 3, which allows agencies to 
withhold records that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. 
Exemption 1 is the national security exemption;15 Exemption 3 implicates 
national security because several withholding statutes—particularly the 
National Security Act and the Central Intelligence Agency Act—authorize the 
CIA, the FBI, the Department of Defense, and other agencies to protect large 
swaths of national-security-related records.16 Defense and intelligence agencies 
have been among the most vocal critics of FOIA17 and have typically had the 
lowest disclosure rates.18 
The current framework for administering national security exemptions 
came into being with FOIA’s first set of amendments,19 which substantially 
limited agencies’ ability to withhold documents for national security reasons. 
 
12.  DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 5. 
13.  S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965). 
14.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9) (2000). 
15.  See, e.g., ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 F. Supp. 2d 20, 27 (D.D.C. 2003) (“Exemption 1 
is FOIA’s national security exemption.”). 
16.  See DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 247-49.  
17.  See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Two Unsolved Constitutional Problems, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 753, 761 
(1988) (“[M]ost of [the security agencies] do not like the FOIA one whit . . . .”). 
18.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Freedom of Information Act: Annual FOIA Reports, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/04_6.html (last visited Sept. 27, 2005) (reporting agencies’ 
disclosure performance for fiscal years 1998 through 2004). For each of the past seven years, 
the CIA and the FBI have had among the lowest—and usually the lowest—ratios for any 
federal agency of FOIA requests granted to requests processed or answered. 
19.  Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 
(2000)). 
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Overriding a presidential veto, Congress passed the 1974 amendments with the 
express purpose of overruling the Supreme Court’s holding in EPA v. Mink20 
that courts should not review the substantive propriety of agencies’ 
classification decisions.21 Seeking to empower courts to rectify “the widespread 
abuses raging under the existing classification process,”22 Congress changed 
Exemption 1 from exempting all matters “specifically required by Executive 
order to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy”23 
to exempting only those matters that “are in fact properly classified pursuant to 
such Executive order.”24 Congress further narrowed Exemption 1, and all other 
exemptions, by inserting into FOIA a “segregation” provision requiring that 
“[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a record shall be provided to any 
person requesting such record after deletion of the portions which are 
exempt.”25 That is, Congress displaced “records” as the relevant unit of analysis 
under the Act: Agencies invoking exemptions would now have to look within 
records so as to excise only the minimal amount necessary. To facilitate 
meaningful judicial oversight, Congress authorized courts to review FOIA 
appeals de novo and inspect documents in camera, and placed the burden on 
agencies to sustain all withholding actions.26 
2. Judicial Review in FOIA National Security Cases 
After exhausting administrative remedies, a dissatisfied FOIA requester 
may contest agency decisions in federal district court.27 In light of the 
 
20.  410 U.S. 73 (1973). 
21.  S. REP. NO. 93-1200, at 11-12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.); H.R. REP. NO. 93-1380, at 12 (1974) 
(Conf. Rep.). 
22. 120 CONG. REC. 17,019 (1974) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
23.  FOIA, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (1966) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970)). 
24.  Act of Nov. 21, 1974, § 2(a) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)(B) (2000)). Rooted 
textually to these executive orders’ definitions of national security, Exemption 1 has no 
meaning independent of them. The prevailing executive order establishes what types of 
information agencies will seek to exempt from FOIA, what processes they will follow and 
what standards they will apply in so doing, and for how long. 
25.  Id. § 2(c) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000)). 
26.  Id. § 1(b)(2) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B), 552(b) (2000)). Judges have broad 
discretion over whether and how to conduct in camera review, see Spirko v. U.S. Postal 
Serv., 147 F.3d 992, 996 (D.C. Cir. 1998), which is often employed in national security cases 
because it allows for confidentiality, DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 801. 
27.  Because FOIA confers (nonexclusive) jurisdiction over all appeals on the D.C. District 
Court, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000), that court hears far more FOIA appeals than any 
other. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 2003 Calendar Year Report on Department of Justice 
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Executive’s “unique insights into what adverse effects might occur as a result of 
public disclosure,” Congress indicated in drafting the 1974 amendments that 
courts in national security cases should “accord substantial weight to an 
agency’s affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed 
record.”28 To fulfill their intended review role, however, courts strive to accord 
this weight “without relinquishing their independent responsibility”29—
judicial “deference is not equivalent to acquiescence,”30 and “conclusory and 
generalized allegations of exemptions” are not acceptable bases for 
withholding.31 Moreover, Exemption 1, like all the exemptions, must be 
narrowly construed.32 Nevertheless, the standard for withholding records on 
national security grounds remains accommodating, as courts test agencies’ 
national security claims only for reasonableness, good faith, specificity, and 
plausibility.33 They do not typically assess whether the alleged risks of 
disclosure would be likely to materialize, or weigh those risks against other 
interests. 
 This truncated judicial review comports, of course, with courts’ broad 
tendency to defer to the political branches in matters of national security. Such 
deference reflects constitutional and statutory constraints on the judiciary as 
well as self-imposed prudential considerations, but in FOIA cases the 
prudential considerations predominate, for the Act explicitly enables courts to 
review appeals de novo and to order the production of improperly withheld 
documents.34 Courts defer to the Executive because they believe judges “lack 
the expertise necessary to second-guess . . . agency opinions in the typical 
national security FOIA case.”35 Compounding this deference, the government 
has the advantage in FOIA appeals of controlling both the disputed 
information and—through Exemption 1’s reliance on executive orders—the 
definition of national security. The result is that the government almost always 
 
Freedom of Information Act Litigation Activities: Decisions Rendered in 2003, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/04foia/03decisions.htm (last visited Sept. 27, 2005). The D.C. 
Circuit, consequently, has assumed unique significance for FOIA jurisprudence. 
28.  S. REP. NO. 93-1200, at 12 (1974) (Conf. Rep.). 
29.  Goldberg v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 818 F.2d 71, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
30.  Campbell v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
31.  Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 826 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
32.  Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976). 
33.  Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
34.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
35.  Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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wins in FOIA national security litigation.36 In only one Exemption 1 case has a 
court found agency bad faith, and that decision was vacated on appeal.37 The 
CIA, which derivatively classifies more documents than any other government 
body,38 has proven especially invulnerable to FOIA review: The Ninth Circuit 
conceded in 1992 that “we are now only a short step away [from] exempting all 
CIA records from FOIA.”39 As the following Section will show, the mosaic 
theory had already emerged by the end of the 1970s as a powerful withholding 
tool for the CIA. Other agencies would soon follow. 
B. 1972-1980: Marchetti, Halkin, and Halperin 
Although the mosaic theory of intelligence gathering had existed in the 
national security community for some time,40 its first—and still seminal—
exposition in U.S. law came from Chief Judge Clement Haynsworth in the 
1972 Fourth Circuit case United States v. Marchetti.41 Not a FOIA case, Marchetti 
featured a government action to enjoin a former CIA employee from 
publishing an exposé of the agency entitled The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. 
Drawing on an executive right to secrecy under Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution and United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,42 the court 
upheld Marchetti’s secrecy agreement with the CIA and found for the 
government. That much was predictable; more interesting was the prudential 
justification given by the court to reinforce its constitutional arguments: 
 
36.  See Deyling, supra note 6, at 67; Martin E. Halstuk, Holding the Spymasters Accountable After 
9/11: A Proposed Model for CIA Disclosure Requirements Under the Freedom of Information Act, 
27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 79, 131-32 (2004); cf. Wald, supra note 17, at 760 
(remarking, while Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, that de novo review in FOIA national 
security cases “often seems to be done in a perfunctory way”). 
37.  See DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 150-51. 
38.  INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2003, at 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/2003rpt.pdf (reporting classification activity for fiscal year 
2003). 
39.  Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1120 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
40.  Raloff, supra note 6, at 89. The theory was also recognized abroad: In a celebrated 1966 
case, the German government asserted a mosaic theory of treason against the publishers of 
Der Spiegel magazine. See DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF 
THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 397-402 (1989); Herbert Bernstein, Comment, West 
Germany: Free Press and National Security: Reflections on the Spiegel Case, 15 AM. J. COMP. L. 
547, 557 (1967). 
41.  466 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir. 1972). 
42.  299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
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There is a practical reason for avoidance of judicial review of secrecy 
classifications. The significance of one item of information may 
frequently depend upon knowledge of many other items of 
information. What may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of 
great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put 
the questioned item of information in its proper context. The courts, of 
course, are ill-equipped to become sufficiently steeped in foreign 
intelligence matters to serve effectively in the review of secrecy 
classifications in that area.43 
Without labeling it as such, the Fourth Circuit grounded its practical argument 
for judicial restraint in the mosaic theory. Even if judges possess the ability to 
evaluate individual items of national security information, the court reasoned, 
they lack the “broad view” with which to contextualize these items and thereby 
glean their true significance. Consequently, judges should not only defer to 
agency expertise; they should avoid review altogether. The mosaic theory, as 
applied here in a related context, helps vindicate the pre-1974 model of FOIA, 
wherein courts hearing national security cases effectively abdicated disclosure 
decisions to agencies, rendering the Act—in then-Professor Antonin Scalia’s 
words—“a relatively toothless beast.”44 
After several years of dormancy, Marchetti’s thread entered FOIA 
jurisprudence at the end of the decade through the D.C. Circuit, which 
extended Marchetti’s mosaic theory analysis in Halkin v. Helms45 and Halperin 
v. CIA.46 In Halkin, the D.C. Circuit upheld the government’s use of the state 
secrets privilege to deny former Vietnam War protesters’ discovery request for 
information on whether their international communications had been 
intercepted by the National Security Agency (NSA) and disseminated to other 
federal agencies. Noting that state secrets cases and FOIA Exemption 1 cases 
are “analogous,”47 the court, citing Marchetti, likewise situated its deference in 
the mosaic theory.48 In so doing, Halkin invoked the mosaic metaphor in 
 
43.  466 F.2d at 1318. 
44.  Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No Clothes, REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1982, 
at 14, 15.  
45.  598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 
46.  629 F.2d 144 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
47.  598 F.2d at 9. 
48.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. In the subsequent civil suit, the D.C. Circuit 
reiterated the mosaic metaphor quoted in this Note’s epigraph in upholding again the 
government’s use of the state secrets privilege. Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 993 n.57 
(D.C. Cir. 1982). 
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national security law for the first time, and, importantly, linked it to modern 
computer technology. Even in 1978, the potential for computers to increase 
exponentially their users’ ability to process and find patterns in information—
to make mosaics—was clear. Unlike in Marchetti, the jurists in Halkin tried to 
ascertain the mosaic-based risks of disclosure before finding for the 
government. They did so only at a highly general level, however, concluding 
without qualification that “[d]isclosure of the identities of senders or recipients 
of acquired messages would enable foreign governments or organizations to 
extrapolate the focus and concerns of our nation’s intelligence agencies.”49 
In a separate statement explaining why he voted (unsuccessfully) for a 
rehearing en banc, Judge David Bazelon disputed the need for secrecy 
regarding the NSA intercepts and characterized the court’s “utmost deference” 
to the government as violating the legislative intent of the 1974 FOIA 
amendments.50 According to Bazelon, “the panel could have reached its 
decision only by taking the government’s ex parte affidavits at face value and 
refusing to assess their credibility in light of reason and the information already 
made public, the minimal elements of de novo review.”51 By casting the majority 
holding as the “willing suspension of disbelief,”52 Bazelon implied that its 
mosaic discussion had been a sham—the majority had substituted rhetoric for 
analysis, an epigram for sensitive, individualized document review. Applied in 
this way, Bazelon foreshadowed, the mosaic theory could justify virtually any 
withholding. 
Two years later in Halperin, the D.C. Circuit expressly introduced the 
mosaic theory to FOIA to affirm, under Exemptions 1 and 3, the CIA’s 
withholding of documents detailing its legal arrangements with private 
attorneys. After conceding that the disclosure of the CIA’s legal fees, without 
more, would not present obvious national security risks, the court cautioned: 
We must take into account, however, that each individual piece of 
intelligence information, much like a piece of jigsaw puzzle, may aid in 
piecing together other bits of information even when the individual 
piece is not of obvious importance in itself. When combined with other 
small leads, the amount of a legal fee could well prove useful for 
identifying a covert transaction.53 
 
49.  598 F.2d at 8. 
50.  Id. at 14-18 (Bazelon, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
51.  Id. at 17. 
52.  Id. at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
53.  Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
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Fleshing out its mosaic metaphor with a jigsaw puzzle metaphor, the court 
rested its entire holding on the mosaic theory without ever discussing how a 
legal fee could be combined with “other small leads,” whatever these might be, 
to create a national security risk. The mosaic scenario posited here was even 
vaguer than the scenario contemplated in Halkin, yet the D.C. Circuit seemed 
even more reluctant to scrutinize it. While Halperin was not an important 
FOIA case in a direct sense—public interest in the CIA’s legal expenses being 
relatively tepid—it signaled the emergence of the mosaic theory as a potent 
argument for agencies seeking to withhold information. 
Taken together, then, Marchetti, Halkin, and Halperin, in introducing the 
mosaic theory to national security law, use it to bolster judicial deference on 
two levels: They present the theory as a general reason for courts to fear 
disclosure and mistrust their own judgment; and they treat mosaic arguments 
as a unique rationale for nondisclosure, with lower requirements for specificity 
and support. The opinions’ bracing rhetoric, moreover, tints the theory with an 
element of mystery and malice. This logic and language continue to undergird 
mosaic theory jurisprudence, as essentially every subsequent opinion applying 
the theory has cited Marchetti, Halkin, and/or Halperin as key precedent, often 
excerpting the passages quoted above. 
C. 1981-2001: Statutory Recognition, Judicial Deference 
The next important development in mosaic theory doctrine came from an 
extrajudicial source: President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,356, which in 1982 
wrote the theory into law. The source of classification standards for FOIA’s 
Exemption 1, Reagan’s Order stated that “[i]nformation that is determined to 
concern one or more of the [classification] categories . . . shall be classified 
when an original classification authority also determines that its unauthorized 
disclosure, either by itself or in the context of other information, reasonably could 
be expected to cause damage to the national security.”54 Under this language, 
government classifiers were charged with conceptualizing the dangers of 
disclosure in mosaic theory terms, and FOIA courts bound to uphold such an 
approach. By contrast, Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter had been silent 
about the mosaic theory in their analogous executive orders,55 while Presidents 
Truman and Eisenhower had positively rejected it, decreeing: “Documents 
 
54.  Exec. Order No. 12,356, § 1.3(b), 3 C.F.R. 166, 169 (1982) (emphasis added), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (1982). 
55.  Exec. Order No. 11,652, 3 C.F.R. 375 (1973) (Nixon), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 
1975); Exec. Order No. 11,862, 3A C.F.R. 166 (1975) (Ford); Exec. Order No. 12,065, 3 
C.F.R. 190 (1978) (Carter), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1981). 
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shall be classified according to their own content and not necessarily according 
to their relationship to other documents.”56 
Wary of KGB agents exploiting powerful new database technologies, 
President Reagan expressed alarm at the mosaic theory’s implications 
throughout his term in office.57 Although small pieces of unclassified data 
might be innocuous in isolation, he feared they would “reveal highly classified 
and other sensitive information when taken in aggregate.”58 In response, 
Reagan launched a campaign, ultimately abandoned in the face of widespread 
criticism, to safeguard unclassified data in private databases and to limit 
foreigners’ access to public databases.59 In a Reagan Administration they 
already considered excessively secretive, some civil libertarians saw totalitarian 
undertones in this use of the theory. As Democratic Congressman Glenn 
English reportedly remarked, “[c]arried out to its logical conclusion, the 
mosaic theory justifies the withholding of all information, no matter how 
innocuous.”60 
Hence, having written the mosaic theory into classification law, Reagan 
went further and pushed it into the public consciousness—but only for a brief 
while. After he left office, executive branch officials almost never spoke out on 
the mosaic theory, and the critical commentary quickly dried up.61 Though 
 
56.  Exec. Order No. 10,290, § 26.d, 3 C.F.R. 789, 794 (1949-1953) (Truman), reprinted in 50 
U.S.C. § 401 (Supp. V 1952); Exec. Order No. 10,501, § 3(a), 3 C.F.R. 979, 980 (1949-1953) 
(Eisenhower), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1970). 
57.  Mary McIver & William Lowther, Tapping New Secrets, MACLEAN’S, Sept. 28, 1987, at 60, 
60; see also Brock N. Meeks, Uncovering the Secret History of the Cold War: The National 
Security Archive Beats the White House, WIRED, Dec. 1993, at 48, 52 (discussing the Reagan 
Justice Department’s fear that the work of the National Security Archive, a repository for 
declassified government documents, would “nurture the Mosaic Theory, wherein KGB 
agents would be able to piece together US government secrets”). 
58.  National Security Decision Directive 145: National Policy on Telecommunications and 
Automated Information Systems Security (Sept. 17, 1984), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd145.htm. 
59.  See id.; Raloff, supra note 6, at 89-90; McIver & Lowther, supra note 57, at 60-61. 
60.  See McIver & Lowther, supra note 57, at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Lepper, 
supra note 6, at 396 n.49 (“The prevailing fear [regarding Reagan’s codification of the 
mosaic theory in Executive Order 12,356] is that the ‘mosaic theory’ alone provides sufficient 
incentive for overclassification.”); George Lardner Jr., Secrecy System Pronounced Sound, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 1988, at A25 (“‘As a result of this “mosaic theory,”’ [Harvard Vice 
President John] Shattuck said, ‘we have an evolving system of scientific and technical 
censorship in this country.’”). 
61.  A LexisNexis search on “mosaic theory” in the Major Newspapers database, for example, 
yields only three articles written in the 1990s (the second of which is a reprisal of the first) 
that use the term in the intelligence-gathering sense. The same search in the Magazine 
Stories, Combined database yields only one article. 
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abortive, Reagan’s database campaign illuminates several important 
characteristics of the mosaic theory: its conceptual applicability beyond the 
classification process, its potential threat to civil liberties, and its dynamic 
relationship with information technology. When the Bush Administration 
resurrected the Reaganite approach to the mosaic theory after 9/11, all of these 
characteristics would once again manifest themselves.62 
A few years after Reagan’s executive order, the mosaic theory first (and 
last) reached the Supreme Court in CIA v. Sims,63 a 1985 case concerning 
FOIA’s Exemption 3. The CIA had denied the plaintiffs’ request for 
information regarding a CIA-financed research project, code-named 
MKULTRA, established in 1953 to counter Soviet and Chinese advances in 
brainwashing and interrogation techniques. Echoing the government’s brief,64 
the Court cited Halperin, Halkin, and Marchetti in quick succession in 
concluding that “the Director [of Central Intelligence] . . . has power to 
withhold superficially innocuous information on the ground that it might 
enable an observer to discover [through mosaic-making] the identity of an 
intelligence source.”65 The Court reasoned that the Director “must of course be 
familiar with ‘the whole picture,’ as judges are not,” and so his decisions “are 
worthy of great deference.”66 Without qualifying this institutional self-
deprecation or considering possible drawbacks to such “great deference,” Sims 
vigorously endorsed the mosaic theory as a cause for judicial restraint and 
consolidated Halperin, Halkin, and Marchetti as its leading cases. Since Sims, 
the CIA has enjoyed virtually “carte blanche” immunity from FOIA.67 Even 
though the case dealt with the CIA’s enumerated powers under the National 
Security Act, lower courts have applied Sims’s mosaic-theory-based deference 
arguments more broadly, to other agencies and other exemptions.68 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the mosaic theory flourished in FOIA 
national security case law as a justification for classification and narrow judicial 
review. Outside of the D.C. federal courts, where the theory quickly took hold, 
 
62.  See infra Part II. 
63.  471 U.S. 159 (1985). 
64.  Brief for the Respondents at 7, CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985) (No. 83-1249). 
65.  471 U.S. at 178. 
66.  Id. at 179. 
67.  Halstuk, supra note 36, at 102, 112-17. 
68.  Recent examples include Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice, 331 
F.3d 918, 927-28 (D.C. Cir. 2003), in which the court deferred to the Department of Justice 
under Exemption 7, and Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47 (D.D.C. 2003), in which the 
court deferred to the FBI under Exemption 1. These cases are discussed infra Subsection 
II.D.1 and note 133, respectively. 
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the mosaic theory helped support judgments in favor of withholding agencies 
in FOIA national security opinions by, in chronological order, the District 
Court for the Northern District of New York,69 the Sixth Circuit,70 the Third 
Circuit,71 the District Court for the Southern District of New York,72 the Fifth 
Circuit,73 and the Ninth Circuit.74 In none of these cases did the court evaluate 
the agency’s mosaic claims in any detail, address counterarguments, or 
acknowledge tensions between its application of the theory and FOIA. Such 
mosaic-theory-based deference assumed a steadily more significant, though 
low-profile role in FOIA jurisprudence as precedent accrued and as technology 
rendered “intelligence gathering . . . more highly sophisticated” and assessing 
the risks of disclosure “increasingly complicated.”75 
Only one case in this period suggested limits to the mosaic theory. In the 
1987 case Muniz v. Meese,76 the D.C. District Court became the first court to 
reject an agency’s mosaic argument outright. Muniz was a Title VII case in 
which Hispanic special agents of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) alleged 
discriminatory practices, and the government sought to block discovery of the 
DEA’s employment records. The government argued, alongside two other 
primary defenses, that “anyone possessing the employment histories of DEA 
agents could piece together a mosaic of the agency’s worldwide structure, 
capabilities, and enforcement activities.”77 Dismissing this argument in a 
footnote, the court found noncredible the assertion “that information as to 
when particular Hispanic agents were promoted in relation to their non-
Hispanic counterparts would provide anyone with the ability” to make such a 
mosaic.78 The D.C. District Court upset no mosaic theory doctrine with this 
holding, however, and no subsequent courts (or scholars) have ever cited 
Muniz;79 the mosaic postulated by the DEA was too remote from the national 
 
69.  Daily Orange Corp. v. CIA, 532 F. Supp. 122, 126 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). 
70.  Ingle v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 698 F.2d 259, 268 (6th Cir. 1983). 
71.  Am. Friends Serv. Comm. v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 831 F.2d 441, 445-46 (3d Cir. 1987).  
72.  Lawyers Comm. for Human Rights v. INS, 721 F. Supp. 552, 564 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). 
73.  Knight v. CIA, 872 F.2d 660, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1989). 
74.  Hunt v. CIA, 981 F.2d 1116, 1118-20 (9th Cir. 1992). 
75.  In re United States, 872 F.2d 472, 475 (D.C. Cir. 1989). 
76.  115 F.R.D. 63 (D.D.C. 1987). 
77.  Id. at 65. 
78.  Id. at 65 n.7. 
79.  This does not include two subsequent cases directly related to Muniz. See Muniz v. Meese, 
122 F.R.D. 1, 1-2 (D.D.C. 1988); Gallegos v. Thornburgh, Civ. A. No. 88-1869, 1989 WL 
206495, at *3-4 (D.D.C. Nov. 22, 1989). 
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security mainstream to attract notice and too baldly pretextual to be taken 
seriously. 
Outside of the courts, the most significant development in mosaic theory 
law between Sims and 9/11 was President Clinton’s Executive Order 12,958. 
Superseding Executive Order 12,356, Clinton struck Reagan’s mosaic theory 
clause and replaced it with section 1.8(e): “Compilations of items of 
information which are individually unclassified may be classified if the 
compiled information reveals an additional association or relationship that: (1) 
meets the standards for classification under this order; and (2) is not otherwise 
revealed in the individual items of information.”80 Drawing on the “added 
factor” test of an earlier case,81 this provision limits the contextual inquiry to 
preexisting, aggregated, government-controlled information, and it demands 
the revelation, not just the reasonable expectation, of an additional association 
or relationship meriting classification. It is therefore a “somewhat more 
restrictive form” of the mosaic theory, as the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
remarked at the time.82 Yet whatever section 1.8(e)’s intended or implied 
differences from Reagan’s provision, courts hearing FOIA appeals seemed 
unmoved by the new language.83 Mosaic theory doctrine, largely developed by 
courts before any executive order had mentioned the theory, had hardened by 
1995, and the Clinton Administration did little to promote section 1.8(e) as an 
alternative methodology. 
ii. the mosaic theory after 9/11  
As outlined above, the mosaic theory has supported heightened executive 
branch protection of national security information, and heightened judicial 
deference to that protection, for over thirty years. Except for one period in the 
Reagan Administration, the theory provoked little debate or even attention 
because agencies used it in isolated instances, its doctrinal foundations 
remained stable, and its basic premise makes sense. As the Bush 
Administration has increased secrecy and narrowed FOIA in the prosecution of 
 
80.  Exec. Order No. 12,958, § 1.8(e), 3 C.F.R. 333, 339-40 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. § 435 
(Supp. II 1996). 
81.  Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
82.  OFFICE OF INFO. & PRIVACY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT GUIDE 
AND PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 74 (1996). 
83.  E.g., Kasza v. Browner, 133 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1998); J. Roderick MacArthur Found. 
v. FBI, 102 F.3d 600, 604 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Billington v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 11 F. Supp. 
2d 45, 55 (D.D.C. 1998). No published opinion has remarked on section 1.8(e) as requiring 
different analysis, or reevaluated mosaic theory precedent in light of it. 
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its War on terror, however, the mosaic theory has taken on a new prominence. 
In the rush to classify and safeguard information, including a new category of 
“sensitive but unclassified information,” federal agencies have used the mosaic 
theory more aggressively than in the past.84 At the same time, in denying FOIA 
and document-discovery requests, the government has increasingly relied on 
the mosaic theory in court to conceal its actions. The theory has therefore 
supported both more secrecy in the government’s management of information 
and more secrecy about that secrecy by foreclosing scrutiny ex post. Reflecting 
both the gravity of today’s terrorist threats and the Administration’s zeal for 
secrecy in countering those threats, this expansion of the theory—in usage, not 
in concept—has forced judges to confront mosaic claims more explicitly, 
exposing deep divisions in how courts evaluate executive action in an age of 
terrorism. 
This Part analyzes the recent decisions that have grappled with mosaic 
arguments in light of the changing role of information in national security 
strategy. After Section A summarizes the erosion of FOIA since 9/11, Section B 
explains how the attacks sensitized policymakers to the ways in which 
terrorism and technology have been increasing the scope of mosaic threats 
while decreasing their predictability. Section C follows these developments to 
the courts. I suggest that the theory has not only played a decisive role in the 
post-9/11 jurisprudence of information control, but also a divisive role, with 
standard “deference” and “abdication” emerging as challenges to the 
heightened deference (the “delegation”) courts have traditionally applied in 
mosaic cases. Section D concretizes these ruptures in mosaic theory doctrine 
with profiles of the two most controversial post-9/11 mosaic cases. 
A. The Narrowing of FOIA 
Although the Bush Administration exhibited a penchant for secrecy from 
the beginning,85 it made no public alterations to FOIA prior to 9/11. As part of 
its dramatic expansion of government secrecy since the attacks, however, the 
Administration has undermined FOIA on a host of levels, most directly 
through Executive Order 13,292.86 Issued by President Bush in March 2003, 
 
84.  Of course, it is impossible to know exactly how much government classifiers and attorneys 
(in classified submissions) have relied on the mosaic theory. While it seems likely that such 
nonpublic usages of the theory have also proliferated, my arguments here reflect only the 
public record. 
85.  See Anderson, supra note 6, at 1620 n.74; Josh Chafetz, The White House Hides History, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Aug. 27 & Sept. 3, 2001, at 20. 
86.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, 3 C.F.R. 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 (West 2005).  
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this Order rescinds many of President Clinton’s liberal innovations to the 
Reagan classification order. Order 13,292 reintroduces a presumption of harm 
to national security from the release of information provided by or related to 
foreign governments;87 it drops the Clinton restrictions on the duration of 
classifications and the ability to classify information over twenty-five years 
old;88 and it permits once again the reclassification of previously declassified 
information.89 
An October 2001 memorandum on FOIA policy from Attorney General 
John Ashcroft to all federal agency heads,90 meanwhile, rescinded his 
predecessor’s “presumption of disclosure” for all FOIA requests.91 In 1993, 
Janet Reno had announced that the DOJ would “defend the assertion of a 
FOIA exemption only in those cases where the agency reasonably foresees that 
disclosure would be harmful to an interest protected by that exemption.”92 
Ashcroft, by contrast, advised withholding agencies, “you can be assured that 
the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a sound 
legal basis”93—an even more antidisclosure standard than the Reagan DOJ’s 
“substantial legal basis” test.94 Supplementing Ashcroft’s communiqué, a 
March 2002 memorandum from Laura Kimberly, Acting Director of the 
Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO), instructed agencies to take 
“appropriate actions to safeguard sensitive but unclassified information related 
to America’s homeland security . . . by giving full and careful consideration to 
 
87.  Id. § 1.1(c). 
88.  Exec. Order No. 12,958, §§ 1.6, 3.4, 3 C.F.R. 333, 337-38, 343-45 (1995), reprinted in 50 U.S.C. 
§ 435 (Supp. II 1996).  
89.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(c), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 
(West 2005). Given these substantive differences between Bush’s Order and Clinton’s Order 
12,958 which it supersedes, there is a distinctly Orwellian tincture to the latest DOJ FOIA 
guide’s insistence on referring to the Bush Order as “Executive Order 12,958, as amended” 
rather than simply “Executive Order 13,292.” DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, passim. 
90.  Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft to the Heads of All Federal 
Departments and Agencies (Oct. 12, 2001), available at http://www.doi.gov/foia/foia.pdf. 
91.  Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to the Heads of Departments and 
Agencies (Oct. 4, 1993), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foia_updates/ 
Vol_XIV_3/page3.htm. 
92.  Id. 
93.  Memorandum from Attorney General Ashcroft to the Heads of All Federal Departments and 
Agencies, supra note 90. 
94.  Christopher M. Mason, Comment, Developments Under the Freedom of Information Act—1981, 
1982 DUKE L.J. 423, 425 (citing Letter from Attorney General William French Smith to All 
Federal Departments and Agencies (May 5, 1981)). 
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all applicable FOIA exemptions.”95 Kimberly’s memorandum never defines 
“sensitive but unclassified information,” which some have estimated to 
subsume nearly seventy-five percent of all government-held information.96 
In response to the 9/11 attacks and the Ashcroft and Kimberly memoranda, 
federal agencies have removed thousands of documents from their websites 
and classified millions more. Since the Electronic Freedom of Information Act 
Amendments of 1996,97 agencies had increasingly been publicizing their 
records on the Internet, but in the wake of 9/11, as President Clinton’s Chief of 
Staff has observed, “[t]he breadth and the scope of the redaction of 
government information [has been] astounding.”98 The ISOO’s official figures 
indicate that the federal government classified over fourteen million new 
documents in 2003, a nearly sixty-five percent increase over 2001 and the 
largest annual percentage increase for at least a decade.99 In front of a House of 
Representatives panel last year, the director of the ISOO said “[i]t is no secret 
that [the] government classifies too much information” and called the amount 
of overclassification “disturbingly increasing.”100 Scores of critics have charged 
the Bush Administration with obsessive, excessive secrecy and have argued, 
like Professor Geoffrey Stone, that “one cannot escape the inference that the 
cloak of secrecy imposed by the Bush administration has ‘less to do with the 
 
95.  Memorandum from Laura L.S. Kimberly, Acting Dir., Info. Sec. Oversight Office, to 
Departments and Agencies (Mar. 19, 2002), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
bush/wh031902.html. 
96.  JOINT SEC. COMM’N, REDEFINING SECURITY: A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND 
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ch. 2 (1994), http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/jsc; 
see also Scott Shane, Since 2001, Sharp Increase in the Number of Documents Classified by the 
Government, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, at A14 (noting that “vague tags” like sensitive-but-
unclassified “lack clear rules or definitions,” leading one Republican congressional aide to 
call such categories “bogus”). 
97.  Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 3048 (1996) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)). 
98.  John Podesta, Need To Know: Governing in Secret, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS: CIVIL 
LIBERTIES IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM 220, 223 (Richard C. Leone & Greg Anrig, Jr. eds., 
2003). 
99.  INFO. SEC. OVERSIGHT OFFICE, supra note 38, at 19-20 (reporting combined classification 
activity); see also Shane, supra note 96 (describing how “the declassification process . . . has 
slowed to a relative crawl, from a high of 204 million pages in 1997 to just 28 million pages 
last year” and how “[t]he secrecy wave has reached obscure outposts of federal power” like 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration). 
100.  Press Release, ACLU, ACLU Lauds Introduction of Cornyn-Leahy ‘Open Government Act’ 
(Feb. 16, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/NationalSecurity/NationalSecurity.cfm?ID=17485 
&c=108. 
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war on terrorism’ than with its desire ‘to insulate executive action from public 
scrutiny.’”101 
In addition to these moves by the Executive to increase information 
safeguarding and secrecy, Congress has narrowed FOIA in significant ways. 
Placing limits for the first time on who may submit a FOIA request,102 the 2003 
Intelligence Authorization Act amended FOIA to preclude intelligence agencies 
from disclosing records in response to any request made by a foreign 
government entity, either directly or through a representative.103 More 
controversially, Congress has been enacting legislation that limits disclosure 
through Exemption 3’s incorporation of withholding statutes.104 Section 214 of 
the Homeland Security Act of 2002, for instance, exempts from FOIA “critical 
infrastructure information” that is voluntarily submitted to the federal 
government for homeland security purposes.105 As with sensitive but 
unclassified information, critics have argued that critical infrastructure 
information is an overly vague and capacious category whose exemption from 
FOIA will allow the government to withhold records unrelated to national 
security.106 “Congress also has enacted legislation,” the DOJ’s FOIA guide 
observes, “evidently aimed at achieving an ‘Exemption 3 effect’ in an indirect 
fashion—i.e., by limiting the funds that an agency may expend in responding 
to a FOIA request.”107 Finally, Congress has enacted new regulations allowing 
the NSA, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency to exempt their “operational files” from FOIA in the same 
manner as the CIA does.108 
 
101.  GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME 557 (2004) (quoting with 
approval Stephen J. Schulhofer, No Checks, No Balances: Discarding Bedrock Constitutional 
Principles, in THE WAR ON OUR FREEDOMS, supra note 99, at 74, 91); see also Editorial, The 
Dangerous Comfort of Secrecy, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2005, at A20 (criticizing the Bush 
Administration’s “addiction to secrecy” and suggesting that its main purpose in increasing 
classification is “cloaking nonlethal cases of mismanagement and bureaucratic 
embarrassment”). 
102.  DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 19. 
103.  Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-306, § 312, 116 Stat. 
2383, 2390-91 (2002) (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A), (E) (Supp. II 2002)). 
104.  DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 230 & n.18 (providing examples). 
105.  Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 214, 116 Stat. 2135, 2152-55 (2002) (codified at 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A) 
(Supp. II 2002)). 
106.  See, e.g., Christina E. Wells, “National Security” Information and the Freedom of Information 
Act, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 1195, 1214 (2004); Bradley Pack, Note, FOIA Frustration: Access to 
Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 815, 826-27 (2004). 
107.  DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 231. 
108.  See id. at 233 & nn.34-39 (providing citations). 
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B. Mosaic-Making and Informational Paranoia 
As the mosaic theory has risen to prominence in the Bush Administration’s 
paradigm shift away from public disclosure, the theory itself has not changed; 
rather, the national security landscape has changed, and the theory has taken 
on new salience as a result. The dangers of adversarial mosaic-making were 
brutally underscored by the 9/11 attacks, as “[i]t is widely believed . . . that the 
public criminal trials of the men who attempted to blow up the World Trade 
Centers in 1993 made available information about government techniques for 
monitoring terrorists, as well as critical information about what it would take 
to actually bring the towers down.”109 Conversely, the attacks also highlighted 
our government’s failure at defensive mosaic-making, at “connecting the dots” 
that would have predicted the hijackings.110 Shifting the mosaic-making 
advantage back to the federal government will not be easy, however. The 
government now generates and manages more information than ever before, 
and is increasingly doing so in digital form, which permits users to process, 
share, and disseminate the data more easily. The Internet provides a ready 
medium for adversaries to locate and transfer this information, while data-
mining technologies, becoming more powerful and accessible over time, can 
help them extract useful knowledge from otherwise unwieldily large or 
complex data sets.111 Under FOIA, agencies must provide documents in “any 
form or format requested” that is “readily reproducible,” including electronic 
 
109.  CRAIG L. LAMAY, DEMOCRATIC ENTERPRISE: SUSTAINING MEDIA AND CIVIL SOCIETY 6 
(2003). 
110.  See, e.g., MARY DEROSA, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUDIES, DATA MINING AND DATA 
ANALYSIS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 5 (2004), available at http://www.csis.org/media/ 
csis/pubs/040301_data_mining_report.pdf (“Even in hindsight, we can see no single source 
. . . that could have provided the full or even a large part of the picture of what was being 
planned [for 9/11]. We have seen a number of clues, however, that if recognized, combined, 
and analyzed might have given us enough to track down the terrorists and stop their 
plan.”); Donald F. Kettl, Unconnected Dots, GOVERNING, Apr. 2004, at 14 (“In the awful first 
months following the 9/11 attacks, there was constant talk about a need to ‘connect the 
dots.’”). To facilitate and institutionalize counterterrorism dot-connecting—which DeRosa 
stresses has become more crucial since the end of the Cold War, when we relied “on finding 
a relatively few rich sources of intelligence,” DEROSA, supra, at 5—President Bush founded 
the Terrorist Threat Integration Center, now subsumed under the National 
Counterterrorism Center. Press Release, White House, Fact Sheet: Strengthening 
Intelligence To Better Protect America (Feb. 14, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030214-1.html. 
111.  See DEROSA, supra note 110, at 3. DeRosa focuses on the use of data-mining for 
counterterrorism, but would-be terrorists could likewise exploit data-mining tools, both to 
generate otherwise invisible mosaics and, at a minimum, to lower their search costs. 
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formats.112 Courts have not directly considered whether the mosaic theory 
becomes more significant when applied to electronic records, but the Supreme 
Court has acknowledged in discussing personal privacy that, because the value 
of information increases with the facility with which one can use it, computer 
compilations pose special dangers.113 
More broadly, in the post-9/11 national security landscape, intelligence 
gathering and analysis have become perhaps our most important strategic 
assets,114 while critical infrastructure data has become a key liability;115 
communications and computer technologies have increased the volume, 
accessibility, and manipulability of sensitive knowledge and enabled more 
sophisticated scheming;116 new types of adversaries—more dispersed, harder to 
identify, and possibly more ruthless than their predecessors—have 
proliferated; and the specter of another attack on U.S. soil has framed political 
debate and dictated policymaking. Federal agencies are being pressed to 
expand information-sharing with each other,117 but to reduce information-
sharing with the public.118 All of these developments have served to vitalize the 
role of information in national security strategy. That role, however, is 
characterized by uncertainty: As information implicating national security has 
become more heterogeneous and more abundant, we increasingly do not know 
what information matters, or who has it, or how to control it. As the Director 
of the University of Maryland’s Center for Information Policy has observed, 
“there are thousands of nodes of information in the United States and each 
 
112.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(B) (2000). 
113.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 763-64 
(1989). 
114.  See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 30 (2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (“Intelligence—
and how we use it—is our first line of defense against terrorists and the threat posed by 
hostile states.”).  
115.  See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 133(a)(1)(A) (Supp. II 2002) (exempting critical infrastructure 
information from FOIA). 
116.  See, e.g., Todd M. Hinnen, The Cyber-Front in the War on Terrorism: Curbing Terrorist Use of 
the Internet, 5 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 5 (2004) (describing terrorists’ Internet-based 
scheming). 
117.  See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458,  
§ 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (codified at 6 U.S.C.A. § 485(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(F) (West 
2005)) (tasking the President with creating an “information sharing environment” that 
“facilitates the sharing of information at and across all levels of security”). 
118.  See supra Section II.A. 
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does not know what it does not know or what it needs to know.”119 More than 
ever, mosaics usable for terrorism and counterterrorism abound. Seen in this 
light, the narrowing of FOIA and the expanding role of the mosaic theory 
become, normative judgments aside, more understandable. 
C. Deference, Delegation, Abdication, and the Unraveling of Mosaic Theory 
Jurisprudence 
With the mosaic theory and FOIA growing in strategic significance for the 
government since 9/11, courts have had to assess federal agencies’ mosaic 
claims over broad, at times extraordinary acts of secrecy undertaken in the 
name of national security. In the post-9/11 cases summarized below, three 
modes of judicial review emerge. In the first, apparent in holdings by the D.C. 
federal courts, judges treat mosaic claims as a distinct, and privileged, defense 
of secrecy. Because they see mosaic arguments as especially difficult to evaluate 
and mosaic risks as especially frightening in the post-9/11 world, these judges 
are especially reluctant to challenge agency opinion when confronted with 
mosaic claims: These judges treat mosaic claims with an augmented form of 
deference, which amounts to an effective delegation of mosaic theory oversight 
to the agencies themselves. The Third Circuit has gone even further, treating 
mosaic claims not merely with extra deference, but with complete deference. 
Echoing Marchetti’s call for “avoidance of judicial review of secrecy 
classifications,”120 the Third Circuit has countenanced an abdication of mosaic 
theory review. In contradistinction to this approach, a third set of courts has 
opposed the application of any special treatment to mosaic claims. Instead, 
these courts aim to evaluate mosaic claims like any other, with the standard 
deference accorded the government in national security litigation.121 
 
119.  Lee S. Strickland, The Information Shortcomings of 9/11, INFO. MGMT. J., Nov./Dec. 2004, at 
34, 40. 
120.  United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972). 
121.  See supra Subsection I.A.2 (describing standard deference under FOIA). I employ these three 
categories—deference, delegation, and abdication—not to specify a rigorous taxonomy of 
judicial review, but to capture the basic distinctions in the degree and type of deference 
courts have granted mosaic arguments. When reviewing any such argument, a court can 
grant the government the usual FOIA deference, total deference, or something in between. 
(To grant the government no deference or minimal deference would violate explicit 
congressional instruction, a long line of precedent, and deeply held norms of national 
security litigation.) Delegation occupies that space in the deference spectrum between 
standard deference and abdication, so that even though delegation can be seen as 
representing a qualitatively distinctive modality of judicial review, no bright line separates it 
from the other two categories. 
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To help clarify what is distinctive about deference, delegation, and 
abdication, they can be conceptualized, like judicial deference under FOIA 
review more generally, along three main axes: (1) “support,” the extent to 
which the court requires evidence to back up government arguments; (2) 
“specificity,” the extent to which the court requires the government to tailor its 
arguments to the specific withholdings; and (3) “plausibility,” the extent to 
which the court requires clear or convincing showings of potential harm. On 
each axis, delegation rates lower than deference:122 Relative to the typical 
national security FOIA case, delegating courts are more willing to credit 
government arguments unsupported in the record, to allow the government to 
use the same argument across multiple records or classes of cases, and to accept 
as reasonable less persuasive showings of potential harm. They ask less of the 
government, and interpose less of their own reasoning. Abdication represents 
the logical endpoint of such delegation: no review whatsoever. Yet even 
without the abdication of mosaic theory oversight—which only the Third 
Circuit has explicitly endorsed—the effect of delegation is to pare down judicial 
review, already deferential in national security matters, closer to judicial 
acquiescence, and to insulate all but the most outrageous mosaic arguments 
from scrutiny. 
Delegation of mosaic claims is at once traditional and new. It is traditional 
because, as Part I showed, ever since the canonical triad of Marchetti, Halkin, 
and Halperin, courts have accorded the mosaic theory special deference, finding 
for the government in nearly every instance. Indeed, the idea that mosaic 
claims are worthy of special judicial deference arose concomitantly in case law 
with the mosaic theory itself. With the accretion of precedent, the mosaic trope 
came to assume a talismanic quality in national security jurisprudence, 
threatening the skeptical judge with unknown vulnerabilities, unknown evils. 
Halkin and Halperin typify this paranoiac posture and the low-support, low-
specificity, low-plausibility mosaic claims that have succeeded in courts for 
decades.123 What is new about delegation after 9/11 is therefore not the method 
or philosophy of judicial review, but the withholdings to which it has been 
applied. In line with the narrowing of FOIA and expansion of government 
secrecy, the withholdings validated in the recent mosaic theory cases have been 
 
122.  I do not mean to imply that these axes will yield precise quantification. They are presented, 
rather, to help illuminate the salient indicia of deference in this context. 
123.  See supra Section I.B. This is not to say that every court evaluating mosaic claims from 
Halperin to 9/11 applied delegation, nor to deny that deference and delegation may shade 
into each other or that courts may be less than transparent in their reasoning. The point 
here is that delegation started as and has remained the dominant approach to mosaic theory 
review. 
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more speculative, more categorical, and more controversial than the 
withholdings validated before the attacks. Permitting the theory’s blanket 
application across hundreds of individuals and records with minimal 
evidentiary basis, post-9/11 delegation courts have sanctioned a greatly 
enlarged role for the mosaic theory in controlling information. 
The D.C. District Court and the D.C. Circuit, the most important lower 
courts for FOIA law,124 have proven among the staunchest defenders of 
delegation after 9/11. A good example was provided by the District Court in 
ACLU v. U.S. Department of Justice,125 a case pitting the mosaic theory against 
public attempts to learn about the government’s domestic prosecution of its 
War on terror. In ACLU, plaintiffs sued the DOJ under FOIA seeking 
information on the FBI’s use of section 215 of the PATRIOT Act, a provision 
that significantly expands the powers of the FBI under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA) to order “the production of any tangible things” for 
investigations relating to international terrorism or intelligence.126 The 
plaintiffs wanted to learn only the total number of section 215 FISA 
applications placed by the FBI, and did not seek access to the applications’ 
dates, disposition, or content. Even still, the government invoked Exemption 1 
and the mosaic theory to deny their request, reasoning that if the number of 
FISAs which have been requested “were coupled with the number of FISAs 
which have been authorized (a statistic which is publicly available), and the 
number of cases opened/closed per year, a database could be built with relative 
ease which would reveal a detailed road map of how the FBI conducts its 
investigations.”127 
With this argument, the government strained the meaning of “detailed”: 
Such a road map, however constructed, would not be so detailed as to have 
directions, because the plaintiffs were not seeking locations of the requesting 
offices, or indeed to have any substantive content, because the plaintiffs were 
not seeking information about the requests. But despite the narrowness of the 
plaintiffs’ FOIA request and the “widespread and exceptional media interest in 
 
124.  See supra note 27. I discuss the D.C. Circuit in the following Subsection. 
125.  321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004). 
126.  Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 
272, 287-88 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Supp. II 2002)). 
127.  Supplemental Declaration of David M. Hardy at 6, ACLU, 321 F. Supp. 2d 24 (No. 03-CV-
02522). The “road map” in Hardy’s argument substitutes for the more common mosaic 
metaphor. Hardy goes on to explicitly invoke mosaic terminology and precedent later in his 
declaration. Id. at 7. 
POZEN NOTE 120600 (POST FLIP INPUTS POST POST) 12/19/2005  6:44:51 PM 
the mosaic theory 
655 
 
which there exist possible questions about the government’s integrity,”128 the 
court found for the government. “While the resolution of this issue [was] 
hardly free from doubt,”129 the opinion confesses, and while mosaic arguments 
“may cast too wide a net,”130 the court upheld the government’s nondisclosure 
out of deference to the Executive and to mosaic theory precedent.131 The 
government thus prevailed on a mosaic claim with little support, specificity, or 
plausibility. Taken along with other recent holdings, ACLU evinces how the 
D.C. District Court—which hears more FOIA appeals than any other court132—
has remained wedded to delegation in the face of increasingly attenuated 
mosaic claims.133   
 
128.  321 F. Supp. 2d at 31-32. 
129.  Id. at 35. 
130.  Id. at 37. 
131.  Id. 
132.  See supra note 27. 
133.  As controversially, the D.C. District Court upheld the government’s mosaic theory 
arguments in Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35, 47-49, 59 (D.D.C. 2003), and Edmonds v. 
U.S. Department of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004), to deny an FBI 
whistleblower information necessary to prosecute her wrongful termination suit. See, e.g., 
Clay Risen, ’Nuff Said, NEW REPUBLIC, June 7 & 14, 2004, at 12 (casting the government’s 
mosaic arguments as specious and its classification of Edmonds-related documents as an 
attempt to cover up FBI failures). However, it is hard to categorize the Edmonds decisions, 
both of which included in camera document review, as examples of either deference or 
delegation because the opinions divulge only generic information about the government’s 
claims and the records withheld. 
Less politically charged, Aftergood v. CIA, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557 (D.D.C. 2005), offers a 
clearer example of delegation. In Aftergood, the D.C. District Court relied on the mosaic 
theory in granting summary judgment under FOIA Exemption 3 to the Director of Central 
Intelligence’s (DCI) withholding of intelligence budget information from 1947 through 
1970. Despite the apparently harmless public disclosure of 1997 and 1998 budget figures, the 
Acting DCI argued that release of the 1947-1970 figures, “[w]hen coupled with other 
clandestinely obtained information, and when viewed from a perspective spanning many 
decades,” would enable foreign intelligence services “to draw the clearest and most cogent 
picture of U.S. intelligence activities, priorities, vulnerabilities, and strengths.” Declaration 
of John E. McLaughlin at para. 20, Aftergood, 355 F. Supp. 2d 557 (No. 01-2524), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/foia/1947/mclaughlin.pdf. Though historically illuminating, how 
this picture, composed only of aggregated budgetary data over twenty-five years old, might 
threaten national security today was never explained. Compare id., with Patrick S. Roberts, 
“Withering on the Vine” Yet Not Uprooted: Reputation and Autonomy in the CIA and FBI 
9 (May 5, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (on file with 
author) (noting that all of the government-appointed commissions to study the CIA in 
recent decades, including the 9/11 Commission, “agreed that more historical intelligence 
budget data should be released to the public, while some studies advocated complete 
disclosure”). In another recent case involving old records, the Bush Administration 
successfully invoked the mosaic theory in the Eastern District of California to help deny the 
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Juxtaposing ACLU with another PATRIOT Act opinion just issued 
underscores the difference between delegation and deference. In Gerstein v. 
U.S. Department of Justice, a reporter sued to enforce his FOIA request seeking 
summary statistics on the DOJ’s use of section 213 of the PATRIOT Act, a 
“controversial, high-profile component of the [War on terror]” that permits 
courts to issue search and seizure warrants without immediately notifying the 
warrant’s target.134 To protect a six-page compilation indicating the number of 
times each U.S. Attorney’s Office (USAO) had used section 213, the DOJ 
asserted the mosaic theory under FOIA Exemption 7(E), which allows agencies 
to withhold records whose release “would disclose techniques and procedures 
for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose 
guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure 
could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.”135 To “‘reveal a 
statistical distribution [of section 213 usage] by particular USAO,’” the DOJ 
claimed, “could allow criminals ‘to direct [their] efforts to a disclosed weakness 
and avoid a disclosed strength in the national law enforcement system.’”136 
Noting that the government’s “sole support for its parade of horribles [was 
this] conclusory assertion,” the District Court for the Northern District of 
California—though it upheld the government’s Exemption 7(C) privacy claim 
in spite of prior DOJ disclosures137—rejected its 7(E) claim as “dubious.”138 
Among other deficits in the government’s reasoning, Judge Ronald Whyte’s 
opinion noted that “the fact that a certain USAO has yet to use Section 213 is 
hardly a reliable indicator that it will continue not to do so;”139 “the [section 
213] ‘procedure’ here is a matter of common knowledge;”140 and the attorney 
whose declaration explicated the government’s mosaic claim “has no special 
expertise in criminology or criminal psychology.”141 With this commonsensical 
 
National Security Archive’s FOIA request for selected Presidential Daily Briefs from the 
Lyndon Johnson presidency, even though these briefs were over thirty years old and a 
number of similar briefs had already been released without incident. Berman v. CIA, 378 F. 
Supp. 2d 1209, 1217-18 (E.D. Cal. 2005). 
134.  No. C-03-04893, slip op. at 2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005) (order granting in part and denying 
in part cross-motions for partial summary judgment, denying in part motion to strike, and 
denying motion for a more definite statement). 
135.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(3) (2000). 
136.  Gerstein, slip op. at 19 (quoting the government’s declaration) (second alteration in 
original). 
137.  Id. at 16-17. 
138.  Id. at 20. 
139.  Id. at 19. 
140.  Id. at 21. 
141  Id. at 20. 
POZEN NOTE 120600 (POST FLIP INPUTS POST POST) 12/19/2005  6:44:51 PM 
the mosaic theory 
657 
 
analysis (and dismissive language), the court made a mockery of the identical 
“road map” logic that had prevailed in ACLU; such conclusory mosaic claims, 
Gerstein protests, lack sufficient support, specificity, or plausibility to prevail 
under FOIA. In so holding, the Gerstein court became the third district court to 
apply deference and reject a mosaic claim involving a controversial PATRIOT 
Act provision.142 
Thus, while a number of post-9/11 courts have, like the D.C. District Court 
in ACLU, continued to apply delegation even if they have grappled more 
 
142.  Gerstein was, however, the first FOIA case to do so. Like the Detroit Free Press and North 
Jersey Media cases discussed infra Subsection II.D.2, these two other PATRIOT Act cases 
featured constitutional challenges and were therefore subject to greater weighting of the 
public interests opposed to secrecy. In Doe v. Ashcroft, the government argued that mosaic 
theory risks justified the preclusion of judicial review of a PATRIOT Act provision 
expanding FBI authority to compel communications firms, through the issuance of 
“national security letters,” to produce customer records deemed relevant to an international-
terrorism- or intelligence-related investigation. 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 523-24 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) 
(construing 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)(2) (Supp. I 2001)), appeal filed sub nom. Gonzales v. Doe, 
No. 05-0570 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2005). Although this mosaic argument persuaded the district 
court that “the Government should be accorded a due measure of deference when it asserts 
that secrecy is necessary for national security purposes in a particular situation involving 
particular persons at a particular time,” here, by contrast, the government sought to 
“universally apply these general principles to impose perpetual secrecy upon an entire 
category of future cases whose details are unknown.” Id. at 524. Unsatisfied with this 
preemptive abandonment of support and specificity, the court demanded a “more targeted 
and precise” approach. Id. (quoting Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 693 (6th 
Cir. 2002)). 
With Doe v. Ashcroft on appeal at the Second Circuit, the FBI demanded customer 
records from a member of the American Library Association under § 2709, and warned the 
institution not to disclose to anyone that the Bureau had sought or obtained the 
information. The institution challenged this gag as an unlawful prior restraint on speech in 
the District Court for the District of Connecticut, and the government rebutted with a vague 
mosaic theory: Although the institution’s identity “may appear innocuous by itself,” the 
government asserted, “it could still be significant to a terrorist organization when combined 
with other information available to it.” Doe v. Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 77 (D. Conn.) 
(granting preliminary injunction), stay granted pending appeal 126 S. Ct. 1 (2005); see also 
Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1 (describing the 
latest developments in this case and revealing that, despite intense opposition from civil 
libertarians and some politicians, “[t]he FBI now issues more than 30,000 national security 
letters a year, . . . a hundredfold increase over historic norms”). After expressing doubts 
about the mosaic theory’s applicability in this non-FOIA context, Gonzales, 386 F. Supp. 2d 
at 77-78, the court held that, regardless, “the defendants’ conclusory statements that the 
mosaic argument is applicable here, absent supporting facts, would not suffice to support a 
judicial finding to that effect,” id. at 78. The court further noted that when it asked the 
government counsel at oral argument if he could confirm that there was, in fact, a mosaic in 
this case that might threaten the FBI’s investigation, he “did not do so.” Id. In addition to 
lacking support and specificity, the opinion suggested by recounting this anecdote that the 
government’s mosaic argument did not even appear plausible to its own lawyers. 
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openly with its costs and benefits, deference has emerged as a viable alternative 
and so fractured mosaic theory jurisprudence. In holdings by the Sixth Circuit 
and several district courts and in a notable dissent on the D.C. Circuit, judges 
like Ronald Whyte have accepted the mosaic theory’s general validity, but 
rejected its unsubstantiated, unpersuasive, or categorical application. Their 
review is meant to be meaningful, though not too searching, as these judges 
accord agencies’ mosaic theory claims, like all national security claims, 
substantial weight—standard deference still means deference.143 
D. Opposing Modalities of Judicial Review: Two Case Studies 
1. Center for National Security Studies 
In Center for National Security Studies v. U.S. Department of Justice144 
(CNSS), a landmark post-9/11 mosaic theory case, public interest groups 
brought a FOIA suit against the DOJ to compel disclosure of information 
about persons detained in the wake of the attacks, including their names, their 
attorneys’ names, dates of arrest and release, locations of arrest and detention, 
and reasons for detention. After the D.C. District Court had ordered release of 
the detainees’ and attorneys’ names but permitted the DOJ to withhold the 
other records under Exemption 7(A),145 the D.C. Circuit reversed in part, 
allowing the DOJ to withhold all requested information under the  
mosaic theory.  
The district court had found the government’s reliance on the mosaic 
theory to withhold the names “misplaced” because “there is simply no existing 
precedent applying the mosaic theory to Exemption 7” and “application of the 
 
143.  Hence, even though the government has lost in several of the deference rulings I describe, a 
court’s application of deference to a mosaic claim by no means ensures a plaintiff victory; to 
the contrary, the government retains the advantage. Examples of post-9/11 FOIA cases in 
which the court applied deference and upheld an agency’s mosaic claim include Coastal 
Delivery Corp. v. U.S. Customs Service, 272 F. Supp. 2d 958, 964-66 (C.D. Cal. 2003), and 
Florida Immigrant Advocacy Center v. National Security Agency, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1332, 1342 & 
n.7 (S.D. Fla. 2005). In both cases the court, through independent analysis, validated 
reasonably well-supported, specific, plausible mosaic arguments—even though the threats 
they represented appeared neither obvious nor severe. Edmonds v. FBI, 272 F. Supp. 2d 35 
(D.D.C. 2003), may also provide an example of the government winning under deference, 
but the opinion reveals too little to permit strong conclusions. See supra note 133.  
144.  331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004). 
145.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002), aff’d in 
part and rev’d in part, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
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mosaic theory would essentially turn 7A into an exemption dragnet.”146 The 
district court also found it troubling that the “key Government affidavit on the 
mosaic theory was not even prepared for this case, but rather [was] a copy of 
the affidavit prepared for an unrelated case filed in the Eastern District of 
Michigan,”147 Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft.148 At oral argument before the 
district court, the first question from the judges and much of the discussion 
concerned the theory.149 Counsel for plaintiffs argued that the mosaic theory 
advocated by the government could authorize “the secret jailing of unlimited 
numbers . . . on immigration violations as long as the government asserts that 
it is done in connection with the terrorism investigation.”150 In their appellate 
brief, the plaintiffs further noted that, as opposed to most previous mosaic 
theory cases, the information at issue here was not classified and had in fact 
been provided to the detainees themselves and to their lawyers, who had been 
free to disclose it however they wished.151 
 Nevertheless, in finding for the government, the D.C. Circuit forcefully 
endorsed its mosaic theory arguments and the need for judicial deference. After 
noting that “America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, 
with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore,”152 the court 
paraphrased the mosaic theory concerns outlined in the government’s Detroit 
Free Press declaration, that “[a] complete list of names informing terrorists of 
every suspect detained by the government at any point during the September 11 
investigation” might “allow terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation 
and more easily formulate or revise counter-efforts.”153 Citing Sims and 
Halperin as mosaic theory precedent,154 the court went on to propound that 
“[i]t is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments 
 
146.  Id. at 103. Interestingly, in contemporaneous cases the D.C. District Court did not seem 
concerned about turning Exemptions 1 or 3 into dragnets. See supra notes 125-133 and 
accompanying text. 
147.  215 F. Supp. 2d at 104. 
148.  195 F. Supp. 2d 937 (E.D. Mich. 2002). This was the district court precursor of Detroit Free 
Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002), discussed in the following Subsection. 
149.  Transcript of Motions Hearing at 8, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (No. 01-
2500), available at http://www.cnss.org/oralargument.htm. 
150.  Id. at 83-84. 
151.  Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 25-26, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 331 F.3d 918 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Nos. 02-5254 & 02-5300), available at 
http://www.cnss.org/Final%20Brief.pdf. 
152.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
153.  Id. (paraphrasing Declaration of Dale L. Watson at 4-5, Detroit Free Press, 195 F. Supp. 2d 
937 (No. 02-70339), available at http://www.cnss.org/watsonaffidavit.pdf). 
154.  Id. at 928-29. 
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made in furtherance of that branch’s proper role [protecting national 
security].”155  
In its unwillingness to second-guess the Executive—a brazenly ahistorical 
stance given that Congress explicitly instructed courts to do so in FOIA 
review156—the D.C. Circuit ignored both the great public interest in the 
propriety of the detentions as well as, it seems, the dictates of common sense. 
For, as the Washington Post’s amicus brief stressed, the government “ha[d] not 
advanced any reason to believe that Al Qaeda—unlike any other rebellious 
faction in history—is so cunning that it can build a [dangerous] ‘mosaic’ from 
simple names of detainees, or that it is so inept that it doesn’t even know when 
significant people have been detained.”157 The government had not denied, 
moreover, “that many, if not most of the detainees neither [were] terrorists nor 
[had] any knowledge concerning terrorism.”158 CNSS’s blanket no-disclosure 
holding therefore vindicated an extreme application of the mosaic theory: 
Through the court’s delegation, the government prevailed on a mosaic claim 
with low plausibility, very little support, and even less specificity. Essentially, 
the court ruled that because the plaintiffs requested too much information—all 
of the detainees’ names and records—they were not entitled to any 
information,159 lest disclosure enable adversarial mosaic-making. 
In a scorching dissent, Judge David Tatel accused the majority’s delegation 
approach of “drastically diminish[ing], if not eliminat[ing], the judiciary’s role 
in FOIA cases that implicate national-security interests.”160 For Tatel, the 
mosaic scenario at the heart of the government’s defense provided too 
speculative a basis for FOIA exemption: 
The only argument that could conceivably support withholding 
innocent detainees’ names is the assertion that disclosure of the names 
 
155.  Id. at 932. Highlighting this passage, Professor Cass Sunstein recently identified the CNSS 
ruling as a prime exemplar of “national security fundamentalism,” the position that “when 
national security is genuinely threatened, the president must be permitted to do whatever 
needs to be done to protect the United States.” Cass R. Sunstein, Monkey Wrench, LEGAL 
AFF., Sept./Oct. 2005, at 37, 37. 
156.  See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text. 
157.  Brief for Amicus Curiae The Washington Post Company et al. in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 24, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d 918 (Nos. 02-5254 & 02-
5300), available at http://www.cnss.org/cnss%20amicus%20brief%20final.pdf. 
158.  Id. 
159.  Brief Amici Curiae for The Washington Post Company et al. in Support of Petitioners on 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 18, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004) (No. 
03-472), available at http://www.cnss.org/Media%20Cert%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf.  
160.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies, 331 F.3d at 951 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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“may reveal details about the focus and scope of the investigation and 
thereby allow terrorists to counteract it.” That [the government] 
believes these harms may result from disclosure is hardly surprising—
anything is possible.161  
Tatel called instead for deference, a “more particularized approach” under 
which the government would, as in an ordinary FOIA case, have to “describe, 
for each detainee or reasonably defined category of detainees, on what basis it 
may withhold their names and other information.”162 
With so much argument devoted to the mosaic theory, the CNSS opinions 
offer the most complete articulation on record of the advantages and 
disadvantages of delegating mosaic claims, and signal the emergence of the 
theory as a governing framework in which to assess post-9/11 security threats. 
The majority-dissent dialectic, furthermore, neatly frames the debate over the 
judiciary’s proper role in regulating the War on terror. As one commentator 
has argued, CNSS “is an immensely significant case because it indicates a shift 
toward greater judicial deference regarding FOIA requests with the post-9/11 
emphasis on homeland security.”163 Whether or not CNSS ultimately proves a 
signpost toward greater deference, its opinions indicate the deep divisiveness 
such a shift would engender, with battle lines drawn around the mosaic theory. 
2. North Jersey Media and Detroit Free Press 
Paralleling the majority-dissent divide in CNSS, the companion cases North 
Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft164 and Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft,165 in the 
Third and Sixth Circuits respectively, likewise turned on the mosaic theory and 
its use by the government to insulate 9/11-related measures from judicial and 
public scrutiny. The Third Circuit applied delegation of the most extreme kind, 
abdication, and found for the government; the Sixth Circuit applied deference 
and found for the plaintiffs. With the Supreme Court denying certiorari in 
North Jersey Media, the disharmony between its holding and Detroit Free Press’s 
epitomizes the way in which mosaic theory doctrine, in stasis for two decades, 
 
161.  Id. at 942 (quoting Declaration of James Reynolds at para. 16, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94 (D.D.C. 2002) (No. 01-2500), available at 
http://www.cnss.org/dojreynoldsdeclaration.htm (emphasis added by Tatel)). 
162.  Id. at 951. 
163.  Anderson, supra note 6, at 1628. 
164.  308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002). 
165.  303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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has become newly unsettled as a result of the Bush Administration’s aggressive 
use of the theory. 
In these cases, consortia of media groups sought access to “special interest” 
deportation hearings involving people whom the Attorney General had 
determined might have connections to or knowledge of the 9/11 attacks. 
Although deportation hearings have long been open proceedings, a September 
21, 2001 directive issued by Michael Creppy, the Chief U.S. Immigration 
Judge, closed off these special interest hearings to the public and the press.166 
To justify this unprecedented move, the government turned to the mosaic 
theory: With public hearings, the information presented “could allow terrorist 
organizations to alter their patterns of activity to find the most effective means 
of evading detection,” while “[i]nformation that is not presented at the 
hearings also might provide important clues to terrorists, because it could 
reveal what the investigation has not yet discovered.”167 
Faced with the same mosaic theory arguments, the circuit courts reached 
opposite conclusions. In North Jersey Media, although the Third Circuit 
acknowledged that the plaintiffs “are undoubtedly correct that the 
[government’s mosaic arguments] are to some degree speculative,” it held that 
“given judges’ relative lack of expertise regarding national security and their 
inability to see the mosaic, we should not entrust to them the decision whether an 
isolated fact is sensitive enough to warrant closure.”168 For the Third Circuit, 
 
166.  Memorandum from Michael J. Creppy, Chief Immigration Judge, to All Immigration 
Judges and Court Administrators (Sept. 21, 2001), available at http://news.findlaw.com/ 
hdocs/docs/aclu/creppy092101memo.pdf. 
167.  Brief for Appellants at 48, Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d 681 (No. 02-1437) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). Within a year of the Creppy directive, the DOJ also advanced mosaic theory 
justifications in the preambles of two related regulations enabling greater court control of 
information about immigration detainees. See Protective Orders in Immigration 
Administrative Proceedings, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.46 (2004); Release of Information Regarding 
Immigration and Naturalization Service Detainees in Non-Federal Facilities, 8 C.F.R. §§ 
236, 241 (2004). The Department of Transportation, in the preambles to two new 
regulations restricting the access of persons denied airmen certificates for national security 
reasons to information about their denials, similarly invoked the mosaic theory. See Threat 
Assessments Regarding Alien Holders of, and Applicants for, FAA Certificates, 49 C.F.R. § 
1540.117 (2004); Threat Assessments Regarding Citizens of the United States Who Hold or 
Apply for FAA Certificates, 49 C.F.R. § 1540.115 (2004). 
168.  308 F.3d at 219 (emphasis added) (paraphrasing with approval the government’s 
argument). Judges, in this view, cannot “see” the mosaic even after the government has 
described it for them. Cf. THE MATRIX (Warner Bros. 1999) (“Unfortunately, no one can be 
told what the Matrix is. You have to see it for yourself.”). Judge Scirica’s North Jersey Media 
dissent also found mosaic concerns significant, but would have allowed immigration judges 
to make determinations on whether a given special interest deportation hearing should be 
closed. 308 F.3d at 227-28 (Scirica, J., dissenting). 
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like the Fourth Circuit in Marchetti,169 mosaic theory considerations did not 
merely make judicial review of special interest cases more complicated; they 
made judicial review inappropriate. 
In Detroit Free Press, by contrast, the Sixth Circuit, after conceding the 
general validity of the mosaic theory and the Executive’s superior knowledge of 
national security threats, nevertheless found the Creppy directive 
unconstitutionally “over-inclusive.”170 “While the risk of ‘mosaic intelligence’ 
may exist,” the court argued, “we do not believe speculation should form the 
basis for such a drastic restriction of the public’s First Amendment rights.”171 
Fearing that the “[g]overnment could use its ‘mosaic intelligence’ argument as 
a justification to close any public hearings completely” and to “operate in 
virtual secrecy in all matters dealing, even remotely, with ‘national security,’”172 
the Sixth Circuit echoed Judge Tatel’s CNSS dissent in applying deference—
and demanded a more direct showing of potential harm than a generic appeal 
to the mosaic theory. 
iii. evaluating mosaic claims: theory and application 
Having summarized the history and current status of mosaic theory 
jurisprudence, I explore in this Part the theoretical, legal, and policy 
dimensions of applying the theory under FOIA. Comparing mosaic claims to 
ordinary exemption claims, Section A questions the assumption that mosaic 
claims are special, and therefore worthy of special forms of judicial review. The 
distinctive feature of mosaic claims is not, I contend, that they involve mosaic 
analysis or facially innocuous information, but rather the degree to which they 
may depend on speculative reasoning by the government. Mosaic theory 
doctrine, consequently, has been misconceived from the start.  
As discussed above, mosaic-making and information generally have taken 
on new salience in national security strategy after 9/11, with today’s mosaic 
threats both more numerous and more speculative than ever before.173 In light 
of these developments, Section B presents arguments in favor of courts 
 
169.  See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
170.  303 F.3d at 708. 
171.  Id. There is irony in this: Whereas the D.C. Circuit in CNSS found the government’s 
Watson declaration sufficient to justify secrecy over post-9/11 detentions, here the Sixth 
Circuit found the same Watson declaration—which was originally prepared for this case and 
simply reproduced for CNSS—insufficient to justify secrecy over post-9/11 deportation 
hearings. 
172.  Id. at 709. 
173.  See supra Section II.B. 
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delegating mosaic claims, while Section C presents counterarguments. Because 
it is such an outlier, I do not explicitly address abdication in either Section; as 
an extension of delegation, abdication possesses its same merits and demerits, 
only in greater proportion. I conclude that, whatever its risk-reducing 
potential, delegation (and, by extension, abdication) is legally unjustified and 
practically unwise. Rather than review mosaic claims with extra deference, as 
courts have traditionally done, courts ought to review these claims with extra 
scrutiny and skepticism on account of their susceptibility to misuse. Section D 
offers suggestions on how judges can do this in practice. 
A. “Mosaic” Claims and “Ordinary” Exemption Claims 
For all the mosaic theory’s status and import in national security 
information law, courts have never set out to analyze it beyond a recitation of 
the mosaic (or jigsaw puzzle, or road map) metaphor. Underlying courts’ 
application of special deference to agencies’ mosaic claims, however, is the idea 
that there is something special about those claims as compared to other claims 
for FOIA exemption. Whereas a typical exemption claim involves only one 
piece of information, the standard argument runs, mosaic claims involve 
multiple pieces of information interacting with each other in potentially 
nonobvious ways; as a result, mosaic claims are more difficult for judges to 
evaluate and so demand additional deference. Judges lack the “broad view of 
the scene,” in Marchetti’s figuration, to “put the questioned item of information 
in its proper context.”174 They cannot “see the mosaic.”175  
The simplicity of this argument masks its fundamental errors: assuming 
that information (in non-mosaic cases) can be dangerous in and of itself, and 
assuming that information relevant to national security comes packaged in 
stable, meaningful units. To the contrary, information can become dangerous 
only in combination with other information and capabilities, and no clear 
boundaries demarcate one “piece” or “item” of information from another. To 
illustrate, consider two scenarios. In Case One, an ordinary national security 
FOIA case, the disclosure of requested record A poses a national security risk. 
In Case Two, a mosaic theory case, requested records B and C pose a risk only 
when taken together. What makes A, or B + C, dangerous? For either to create 
an actual threat to national security, an adversary must be able to assimilate 
this new information into its other information and have the capacity to act on 
the end product. Information poses no intrinsic threat, for to be dangerous, 
 
174.  United States v. Marchetti, 466 F.2d 1309, 1318 (4th Cir. 1972). 
175.  N. Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 219 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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even the recipe for the atomic bomb demands an understanding of what it is, 
how to interpret it, and access to the ingredients. For FOIA courts, 
consequently, proper contextualization always matters; courts must always be 
mindful, as the current executive order on classification instructs, of additional 
“relationship[s] . . . not otherwise revealed in the individual items of 
information.”176 To advocate delegation—or, like Marchetti and North Jersey 
Media, abdication—in cases where mosaic analysis is necessary is to advocate 
delegation in every national security FOIA case. 
If risk determination thus depends inescapably on a “broad view” and 
“proper context,” what makes Cases One and Two different? Because FOIA 
recognizes no distinction between complete records and parts of records—the 
Act’s segregation clause requires that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 
record” be released177—B + C can always be reconceptualized as D, a single unit 
of information (or, conversely, as many smaller units). A, likewise, can be 
reconceptualized, and segregated, into any number of alternative 
configurations. The essential arbitrariness of defining units of information 
under FOIA renders illusory the analytic distinction between Case One and 
Case Two, between an ordinary FOIA case and a mosaic one. Only an empty 
formalism would, ceteris paribus, justify judges treating Case Two with more 
deference than Case One or, if A = B + C, justify releasing more information in 
Case One than in Case Two. Coupled with the insight that every national 
security exemption claim is, ultimately, a mosaic claim, this deconstruction 
holds arresting implications: Inasmuch as the rush to judicial collapse in the 
face of “mosaic” arguments has been predicated on a belief in their uniqueness, 
it has lacked any legitimate analytic basis. 
However, even though the notion of the mosaic theory as a distinctive class 
of exemption claim cannot withstand scrutiny, mosaic arguments may still 
differ from each other in meaningful ways—for example, in the degree to 
which they encompass information that would not otherwise merit protection, 
and in the degree to which they are speculative. The former attribute has 
typically determined whether or not an argument receives the mosaic label: 
When a relatively high portion of the information claimed exempt would be 
independently unclassifiable, agencies and courts identify the argument as an 
application of the mosaic theory. But it is the second attribute, speculativeness, 
that most influences the nature of the FOIA judge’s task. Assume in a given 
case that X represents the government-controlled information requested 
 
176.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.7(e), 3 C.F.R. 196, 200 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 
(West 2005). 
177.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000); see supra Subsection I.A.1 (explaining the segregation 
requirement). 
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through FOIA, and Y the external information the government fears will be 
combined with X to form a dangerous mosaic. Because the government 
controls X, it can describe X in detail for the court and, if necessary, present X 
for in camera review. The government cannot, by contrast, present Y for 
review. Indeed, it may not even be able to describe Y or know what Y is or who 
has it. The government must use deductive reasoning, possibly supplemented 
by intelligence reports, to convince the court that adversaries could combine 
the disputed information X with Y (whatever Y is) in a harmful way. While a 
prediction of national security harm from FOIA disclosure “will always be 
speculative to some extent, in the sense that it describes a potential future harm 
rather than an actual past harm,”178 predictions that depend more on Y are 
necessarily more speculative in that they rely more on absent, and perhaps 
unknown, information. More precisely, a mosaic claim’s speculativeness will 
vary inversely with the ratio of X to Y, with the amount of government 
knowledge about Y, and with the amount of government knowledge about 
adversaries’ capacity to access and exploit Y. The lower the percentage of the 
posited mosaic for which the government can provide evidentiary support, the 
greater the speculativeness, and the greater the judicial deference needed to 
sustain the exemption claim. 
Since 1995, the prevailing executive order on classification has required for 
all classifications that authorities be “able to identify or describe the damage” to 
national security that “reasonably could be expected to result” from 
disclosure.179 Mosaics comprising substantial amounts of extrinsic information, 
about which the government does not possess full knowledge, tax both the 
government’s ability to identify or describe their risk and the integrity of a 
reasonableness standard for evaluating the likelihood of damage. As mosaic 
claims become more speculative, the national security expertise gap between 
the government and the court widens and the task of judicial review becomes 
more difficult. And in the wake of 9/11, mosaic threats to national security have 
become more speculative, and more alarming, than ever before. 
B. Advantages of Delegation 
If today’s terrorist threats are characterized by their simultaneous intensity 
and uncertainty, judicial reluctance to question mosaic theory claims might be 
seen as a rational response. Decisionmaking about information disclosure has 
 
178.  Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
179.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 
(West 2005). 
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always been constrained by the practical impossibility of measuring the costs 
and benefits of openness versus secrecy. This informational deficit exacerbates 
a tension that has always existed in FOIA between the goal of promoting 
transparent, accountable government and the imperative not to endanger 
national security in the process. Yet because the potential costs of an ill-advised 
FOIA disclosure, and the difficulties of evaluating what might constitute an ill-
advised disclosure, are seen to have increased after 9/11, the balancing calculus 
has shifted. Adversarial mosaic-making now seems especially dangerous and 
unpredictable. In response, post-9/11 courts applying delegation have upheld 
agencies’ highly speculative, highly generalized mosaic claims when disclosure 
would pose no evident danger; they have demanded little from the agencies in 
the way of support, specificity, or plausibility. Delegation errs, more so than 
deference, on the side of nondisclosure. In its caution, it instantiates a 
conservative vision of information policy, wherein executive agencies, not 
courts, should control information, and more control is presumed safer. 
For those who advocate utmost judicial deference to the Executive in times 
of emergency, and who see the present as such a time, delegation holds obvious 
appeal. Lest they compromise the War on terror, decisions like CNSS, North 
Jersey Media, and ACLU self-consciously integrate the mosaic theory into, in 
the approving words of constitutional scholar John Yoo, “a deferential standard 
of scrutiny that provides the political branches with the flexibility to conduct 
war successfully.”180 By empowering the Executive with greater control over 
information, delegation sacrifices liberty, in the form of governmental 
transparency, for the sake of security. As with the shift in power from judiciary 
to executive, many accept this tradeoff in a time of emergency. From its 
coinage in Marchetti, Halkin, and Halperin, the mosaic theory has been a vehicle 
for increasing judicial deference. Now that this heightened deference 
accommodates the War on terror, it may—irrespective of the exceptional 
mosaic concerns arising after 9/11—appear particularly prudent and legitimate. 
An additional argument for delegation is prudential in a narrower sense: It 
economizes on administrative and judicial effort. FOIA requests routinely 
encompass thousands of pages of government records. Scouring all requested 
records for possible mosaics may consume substantial agency resources, 
especially if the agency does not know what information (and information 
technologies) adversaries possess. Although courts have traditionally been 
sensitive to such administrative burdens,181 they have demanded that agencies 
articulate a reasonably specific justification for each document or section 
 
180.  John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 427, 451 
(2003). 
181.  See, e.g., Assassination Archives & Research Ctr. v. CIA, 177 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2001). 
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withheld.182 Post-9/11 courts applying delegation, by contrast, have allowed 
information withholding under generic, categorical descriptions of mosaic 
consequences—in CNSS, recall, the government defended its mosaic claims 
with the exact declaration it had used in Detroit Free Press, and won. In a few 
pages of argument, that declaration swept all information about all detainees 
under the mosaic theory, sparing the government the burden of having to 
“describe, for each detainee or reasonably defined category of detainees, on 
what basis it may withhold their names and other information,” as Judge 
Tatel’s “more particularized approach” would have demanded.183 The D.C. 
Circuit was, in turn, spared the burden of having to evaluate such descriptions, 
which may have required extensive in camera review. The difference between 
deference and delegation is one of degree here, rather than kind; the mosaic 
theory deals in aggregates and conjectures and so can always act as a labor-
saving device when the government does not control all of the mosaic’s 
components. Relative to standard deference under FOIA national security 
review, however, delegation saves more effort by extracting nearly all 
“particularity” from the process of asserting and analyzing mosaic defenses. 
C. Problems with Delegation (and Deference) 
Even if delegation appears attuned in these ways to the post-9/11 national 
security environment, its application raises a set of insoluble legal and policy 
problems. (Abdication, again, exacerbates delegation’s disadvantages as well as 
its advantages.) Legally, delegation threatens FOIA’s principles of segregation 
and individualized document review; it undermines the Act’s allocations of 
burdens, if not de novo review itself; and it violates legislative intent. 
Practically, delegation permits weak, irrebuttable arguments to justify 
nondisclosure; it invites agency opportunism and abuse; it lacks theoretical 
limits; it facilitates excessive secrecy; and it impairs the courts’ institutional 
integrity.184 Speculative mosaic claims may have greater force in today’s world, 
but their validation comes at a steep price. There is no analytic justification, 
moreover, for holding a professed “mosaic” claim to lower standards of 
specificity and plausibility than a claim not blessed with the mosaic moniker. 
 
182.  See King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
183.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 951 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (Tatel, 
J., dissenting). 
184.  Although the legal problems addressed in this Section pertain specifically to FOIA, 
delegation’s policy problems obtain equally in other contexts. 
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1. Legal Problems 
The effort-saving processual advantages of delegation exacerbate a tension 
that has always existed between the mosaic theory and FOIA’s text. By blurring 
the lines between exempt and nonexempt content, the mosaic theory collides 
with FOIA’s requirement that “[a]ny reasonably segregable portion of a 
record” must be released after appropriate application of any exemptions.185 In 
1987, the Third Circuit explicitly confronted this tension in American Friends 
Service Committee v. Department of Defense,186 a FOIA case in which plaintiffs 
sought disclosure of a series of unclassified Department of Defense technical 
reports. In denying the plaintiffs’ request, the court reflected: “The doctrine of 
segregability suggests that we should order the release of that number of 
reports which can be disclosed without the whole picture becoming ‘guessable.’ 
We are most reluctant to determine, however[,] . . . what the number of entries 
is . . . at which the picture becomes ‘guessable.’”187 That is, somewhere in 
between releasing zero reports and all the reports there lay a tipping point 
beyond which a dangerous mosaic would become guessable; the Third Circuit 
did not believe that it should risk triggering this revelation, or that it should be 
the body to locate the tipping point.  
Although the mosaic theory was held in this case and others not to violate 
FOIA’s segregation requirement,188 some argue that the theory allows agencies 
to circumvent the provision because it “requires agencies to classify 
information that is harmless when segregated—and, therefore, ‘reasonably 
segregable’—but potentially damaging to national security interests when 
combined with other information.”189 One does not have to accept this 
interpretation of “reasonably segregable” to accept that as mosaic claims for 
exemption have become more speculative, categorical, and attenuated, they 
have become more likely to sweep in records that could have been segregated 
and released without a reasonable likelihood of harm. 
Applying the segregation doctrine to mosaic claims, courts can still enforce 
the usual requirement that a “withholding agency must describe each document 
or portion thereof withheld, and for each withholding it must discuss the 
 
185.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000). 
186.  831 F.2d 441 (3d Cir. 1987). 
187.  Id. at 445-46. 
188.  Id.; see also Taylor v. Dep’t of the Army, 684 F.2d 99, 102-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982). 
189.  Lepper, supra note 6, at 397 (evaluating and quoting from section 1.3(b) of Reagan’s 
executive order on classification). Ironically, the thousand-plus-page DOJ FOIA guide 
discusses the segregation requirement under Exemption 1 immediately after the mosaic 
theory, without comment on their relationship. DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 185-88. 
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consequences of disclosing the sought-after information.”190 This tailoring is 
precisely what delegation (and abdication) does not do. In North Jersey Media, 
the Third Circuit cites the mosaic theory as grounds for denying any access to 
all special interest deportation hearings, while in CNSS, the D.C. Circuit uses 
the mosaic theory to deny publication of any information about all seven-
hundred-plus people detained after 9/11. These cases did not turn on tipping 
points because the government never made arguments specific enough to 
enable such analysis. “In both cases,” Professor Peter Marguiles notes, “the 
government failed to demonstrate the accuracy of its [mosaic] assertion, 
relying on a conclusory affidavit from one law enforcement official [in North 
Jersey Media] and, in [CNSS], on unsupported assertions at oral argument.”191 
Delegation thus saves labor only at the cost of undermining FOIA’s principles 
of segregation and document-by-document review. 
More basically, when courts uphold mosaic claims with minimal scrutiny 
they risk undermining FOIA’s presumption of disclosure. Since the 1974 
amendments, FOIA has placed the burden of sustaining withholding actions 
on the agency.192 However, when judges defer to conclusory warnings about 
mosaics, and accept no counterarguments,193 the effect is to reverse the 
presumption of disclosure.194 With agency expertise so privileged, the integrity 
of de novo review itself begins to unravel. Given that the DOJ has reversed its 
own presumption of disclosure in telling agencies it will support all 
withholding actions unless they lack a “sound legal basis,”195 such uncritical 
judicial affirmation of mosaic claims now figures to prove especially damaging 
to FOIA’s stated allocation of burdens. 
 
190.  King v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 223-24 (D.C. Cir. 1987). When in camera review 
would involve a substantial number of documents, as is often the case, agencies can meet 
their production burden by submitting a “Vaughn index” that itemizes and justifies all 
withheld documents (or portions thereof). Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820, 827 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). Vaughn indices can mitigate, but do not remove, agencies’ descriptive-tailoring 
burden. King, 830 F.2d at 223-24.  
191.  Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the “Zone of Twilight”: Exigency, Institutional Equity, and 
Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 400 (2004). 
192.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) (2000). 
193.  In the vast majority of FOIA national security cases, courts have credited only the opinions 
of the agency classification authority. See infra note 224. 
194.  Professor David Cole, COLE, supra note 6, at 20, and Professor Susan Akram and Maritza 
Karmely, Akram & Karmely, supra note 6, at 652, make a similar point regarding the Bush 
Administration’s reliance on, and some judges’ uncritical application of, the mosaic theory 
in immigration proceedings. 
195.  See supra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. 
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Courts’ delegation of mosaic claims not only diverges from the text of 
FOIA, but also, more dramatically, from the intent of Congress. Given that 
Congress amended FOIA in 1974 specifically to foster substantive review over 
national security cases,196 it is difficult to reconcile delegation, and its expressly 
acquiescent posture, with the Act’s legislative history. By authorizing courts to 
review appeals de novo and examine withheld documents in camera, the 
amendments aimed to fulfill FOIA’s underlying goal of “prevent[ing] [review] 
from becoming meaningless judicial sanctioning of agency discretion.”197 
Judicial review of FOIA appeals was explicitly sculpted to safeguard the 
principles of democratic self-determination and good government. Today’s 
mosaic claims may be more difficult to resolve than their predecessors, but that 
does not absolve courts of their responsibility to evaluate their substance.198 
2. Policy Problems 
If every national security FOIA case is, at bottom, a mosaic case, then it is 
illogical for courts to treat cases differently depending on whether or not the 
government has presented its exemption claim as a mosaic scenario; regardless, 
the court will have to consider mosaic-making possibilities in assessing the 
withholding’s reasonableness. Fixating on whether an exemption claim 
involves mosaics is, in fact, worse than illogical if it deflects attention from the 
relevant aspects of the claim: its support, specificity, and plausibility.199 There 
is no good reason why courts should uphold less narrowly tailored, less 
persuasive government arguments when the specter of mosaic-making is 
raised, no reason why delegation should exist for the specificity and plausibility 
axes.200 Fixing a deference standard for the support axis, however, is more 
complicated, for highly speculative mosaics, composed in large part of 
 
196.  See supra Subsection I.A.1. 
197.  S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 8 (1965). 
198.  Inadequate judicial review of mosaic theory claims appears especially troubling in the 
context of the state secrets privilege, asserted sometimes (but not exclusively) in FOIA 
litigation, in that it deprives litigants of their right of access to court. See, e.g., Edmonds v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 323 F. Supp. 2d 65, 77-78 (D.D.C. 2004). In state secrets cases, the 
mosaic theory, if misused, undermines due process in addition to principles of democratic 
self-determination and good government. 
199  Sincerity is a fourth relevant aspect, but to a significant extent support, specificity, and 
plausibility should proxy for sincerity, which—as suggested by the virtually complete 
absence of bad faith findings in Exemption 1 litigation, see supra note 37 and accompanying 
text—will often be difficult for courts to assess independently. 
200.  See supra Section II.C (defining axes of deference). 
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inaccessible and even unknown information, may indeed pose a threat to 
national security, now more than ever. 
From a plaintiff’s standpoint, the fundamental difficulty with courts 
upholding highly speculative mosaic claims under a delegation approach is that 
it will often be impossible to falsify or rebut such claims. In its most tentative 
formulation, the classic mosaic argument against disclosure runs: An 
unidentified adversary might at an unspecified time use this information 
alongside other unknown information to help construct a mosaic that will 
threaten national security in an unpredictable way. As Professor Jane Kirtley 
has commented, such a theory is “impossible to refute . . . because who can say 
with certainty that it’s not true?”201 There are infinite possible informational 
mosaics that could be constructed from the release of any record, the expected 
impact of each one of which has a distinct probability and magnitude. 
Evaluating what harms “reasonably could be expected to result” from 
disclosure—the legal standard by which judges evaluate the propriety of 
classification decisions202—becomes especially problematic in the context of a 
theoretical construct so characterized by uncertainty. Given courts’ baseline of 
deference in national security cases, the predictable result is that they have 
rejected only the most fantastical mosaic arguments: Gerstein, handed down in 
the fall of 2005, was the first published FOIA opinion to reject an agency’s 
mosaic argument on its logic (as opposed to procedural deficiencies or 
countervailing considerations).203 Amplifying deference for a category of claims 
already so insulated from scrutiny seems perverse. 
The practical unfalsifiability of highly speculative mosaic claims not only 
problematizes judicial review; it also makes the mosaic theory ripe for agency 
opportunism and abuse. This is the casuistry, and the slippery slope, lurking in 
the background of the mosaic theory—a creative agency can justify almost any 
withholding under it. Indeed, anecdotal accounts suggest that executive 
officials gravitate to the mosaic theory precisely when they know their case for 
withholding documents is weak.204 Intelligence agencies are known to dislike 
 
201.  Adam Liptak et al., After Sept. 11, a Legal Battle on the Limits of Civil Liberty, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
4, 2002, at A1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
202.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 
(West 2005); see also supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
203.  Gerstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, No. C-03-04893, slip op. at 19-21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 
2005); see supra notes 134-142 and accompanying text. 
204.  E.g., E-mail from David Vladeck, Former Dir., Publ. Citizen Litig. Group, to David Pozen 
(Mar. 25, 2005) (on file with author) (“The government never has to defend the soundness 
of its mosaic theory, which of course is why the government gravitate[s] to that theory 
above all others.”).  
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FOIA,205 and all government agencies lack incentives for disclosure, yet the 
agencies alone control the requested information, making the Act amenable to, 
if not destined for, undercompliance in security-related areas. When courts 
delegate mosaic theory claims, they create a ready vehicle for opportunistic 
withholding. 
Even without intentional abuse, the application of delegation creates 
dramatic potential for overbreadth—for an “exemption dragnet”206—because it 
permits the government to withhold even the most innocuous (and politically 
controversial) items of information without specifying how each item might 
facilitate a dangerous mosaic.207 The Bush Administration’s policy of 
encouraging the withholding of “sensitive but unclassified information,” 
presumably under a mosaic theory rationale, seems to have formalized such a 
role for the theory. Suggesting what withholdings under this standard might 
look like, the government’s argument in ACLU that releasing merely the total 
number of section 215 FISAs sought by FBI field offices could reveal “a detailed 
road map of how the FBI conducts its investigations,” offers a textbook 
example of overbreadth.208 Yet while the Bush Administration, in narrowing 
FOIA and promoting the mosaic theory, has generated particularly fierce 
accusations of abuse and overbreadth, these problems, like delegation itself, 
predate 9/11.209 
The ultimate concern underlying all these problems is that special 
deference to the mosaic theory will corrode the courts’ institutional integrity 
and lead to excessive secrecy. Excessive secrecy has direct costs, of course, for 
people denied information or detained anonymously without good cause. 
These costs may fall disproportionately on certain segments of the population, 
such as immigrants after 9/11, and so impair equity values.210 There are also 
 
205.  See Wald, supra note 17, at 761. 
206.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 215 F. Supp. 2d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2002). 
207.  See Turley, supra note 6, at 233 n.108; see also Hussain, supra note 6, at 1335 (“[T]he very 
nature of the mosaic theory renders it overbroad.”). 
208.  Supplemental Declaration of David M. Hardy at 6, ACLU v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 321 F. 
Supp. 2d 24 (D.D.C. 2004) (No. 03-CV-02522); see supra notes 125-131 and accompanying 
text. 
209.  These problems, moreover, are not confined to Republican administrations. Most notably, 
critics charged the Clinton Administration with abusing the mosaic theory, and courts with 
allowing the abuse, in Frost v. Perry, 161 F.R.D. 434 (D. Nev. 1995), in which the 
government relied on the theory to withhold all information concerning its activities near a 
classified, but well-known area purported to harbor hazardous waste. Richard Leiby, Secrets 
Under the Sun, WASH. POST, July 20, 1997, at F1; Turley, supra note 6, at 232-36. 
210.  See Margulies, supra note 191, at 400-01 & nn.87-88 (arguing that excessive judicial 
deference in CNSS and North Jersey Media offended equity and integrity). 
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indirect social costs of government secrecy—ranging from reducing 
accountability, to hindering technological progress, to degrading public debate, 
to breeding paranoia—which, while they do not capture attention like the 
possibility of inadvertently tipping off a terrorist, are just as real. Disclosure of 
security-related information, furthermore, does not necessarily increase risk, 
but may reduce it by alerting the public to threats and enabling better-
informed responses: As a theoretical matter, it is unclear whether publicizing 
vulnerabilities makes them more or less likely to be exploited.211 Because FOIA 
courts consider only the threatening mosaics presented to them by withholding 
agencies, the exclusively sinister connotations the mosaic metaphor has 
acquired212 thus mask the substantive neutrality of the theory as well as the 
pervasiveness, even banality, of mosaic-making activity.213 Historical 
experience214 and research on humans’ cognitive limitations and biases,215 
moreover, suggest that terrorist threats are particularly likely to trigger 
excessive secrecy and general over-response. For reasons such as these, FOIA 
set out to overcome the federal government’s long-nurtured aversion to 
openness and “pierce the veil of administrative secrecy.”216 Inasmuch as 
delegation—by precluding evidentiary counterargument, by inviting abuse and 
overbreadth in the classification process, and by minimizing substantive 
oversight—generates or facilitates excessive secrecy, it imposes costs on us all. 
 
211.  See DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN, SECRECY: THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60, 80 (1998); James 
A. Goldston et al., Comment, A Nation Less Secure: Diminished Public Access to Information, 21 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 409, 451 (1986). 
212.  In the national security context, I have only seen the mosaic metaphor applied to 
adversaries’ behavior (offensive mosaic-making), never to the public’s or the government’s 
(defensive mosaic-making), even though legions of commentators have used comparable 
metaphors like “connect-the-dots” or “fusion” in describing counterterrorism. See supra note 
110. While the sinister coloration of the mosaic metaphor surely has a complex etymology, 
the oft-repeated Halkin quotation, see supra note 1 and accompanying text, must have played 
a part. 
213.  At a micro level, the banality and pervasiveness of the mosaic theory are predicated on the 
fundamental role mosaic-making plays in how humans process and construct meaning out 
of information. See, e.g., JEROME S. BRUNER, BEYOND THE INFORMATION GIVEN: STUDIES IN 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF KNOWING (1973); JAMES HARTLEY, LEARNING AND STUDYING: A 
RESEARCH PERSPECTIVE 18 (1998) (“Learning results from inferences, expectations and 
making connections.”). 
214.  See Geoffrey R. Stone, Civil Liberties in Wartime, 28 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 215 (2003) (arguing 
that national crises consistently provoke civil liberties restrictions that Americans later come 
to regret). 
215.  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121 
(2003); W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckhauser, Sacrificing Civil Liberties To Reduce 
Terrorism Risks, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 99 (2003). 
216.  Dep’t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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Unlike its susceptibility to abuse and overbreadth, however, inadequate 
judicial review is not an inherent feature of the mosaic theory. To the contrary, 
these inherent features make judicial review of mosaic claims especially 
important. The irony is that the same speculative quality of the theory that 
makes it so attractive for agencies to misuse is the reason why courts have 
increased their deference to agencies relying on it. At the same time, then, that 
the mosaic theory threatens to stimulate excessive governmental secrecy, the 
additional demands it places on judges undermine their ability and willingness 
to confront that secrecy. 
D. Practical Solutions 
As the theory is both sensible and wildly exploitable by agencies, there are 
no easy answers for courts evaluating (highly speculative) mosaic arguments. 
Courts already have tools, however, to mitigate the theory’s excesses. Most 
fundamentally, courts can force withholding agencies to articulate with as 
much specificity and support as possible the mosaic harms they anticipate from 
disclosure. Mosaic metaphors may provide a useful heuristic for 
conceptualizing adversaries’ behavior, but without adequate specificity and 
support they should not be cognizable arguments under FOIA, and without 
adequate plausibility they should not win. Even though a single mosaic claim 
may legitimately encompass a range of documents, some or all of which are 
innocuous in their own right, courts can—with the use of in camera review if 
necessary (and possible)—still enforce FOIA’s segregation requirement by 
demanding justifications for each document or portion thereof withheld.217 
When such justifications are valid, courts should allow withholding and 
thereby avoid triggering an analytic tipping point.218 When, by contrast, the 
withholding agency cannot identify specific mosaic-making scenarios 
reasonably likely to result and describe how they would threaten national 
security, courts should, following the executive order on classification,219 force 
disclosure.220 This is, essentially, standard deference under FOIA: the “more 
 
217.  See supra notes 185-191 and accompanying text. If multiple documents share the same 
function in the posited mosaic, the agency could describe this through a Vaughn index, as in 
any FOIA case. 
218.  See supra notes 186-188 and accompanying text. 
219.  Exec. Order No. 13,292, § 1.1(a)(4), 3 C.F.R. 196, 196 (2003), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.A. § 435 
(West 2005); see supra note 179 and accompanying text. 
220.  Because any piece of information may contribute to infinite possible mosaics, each with a 
distinct probability and magnitude, it would be impossible for reviewing courts to survey 
the entire mosaic landscape. But they do not have to: They need only consider the mosaics 
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particularized approach” intended by Congress in its 1974 amendments, called 
for by Judge Tatel in his CNSS dissent, and applied by courts in Gerstein and 
(outside of FOIA) in Detroit Free Press. Rejecting categorical assertions and 
gross speculation as bases for withholding, this approach aims to align judicial 
review of mosaic claims as closely as possible with review of claims not framed 
in mosaic terms. 
As discussed in Section III.A above, standard deference becomes most 
problematic when faced with a highly speculative mosaic claim, in which a 
high portion of the posited mosaic consists of inaccessible and possibly 
unknown information. At what point does a mosaic become too speculative to 
provide a reasonable basis for withholding information? Practically and 
theoretically, there can be no fixed answer to this question: Some very 
speculative mosaic claims would protect against real threats to national 
security, while others would deny the public valuable yet harmless 
information. As a rule of thumb, though, the more speculative a mosaic claim 
is and the more independently innocuous information it covers, the more 
skeptical should be the court’s review, given the greater risks of abuse and 
overbreadth and given agencies’ predilection for turning to the mosaic theory 
when they know their case for withholding is tenuous.221 Such skepticism, 
evident in Muniz v. Meese222 and Gerstein,223 would help counterbalance the 
expertise gaps that mosaic claims magnify and the opportunism they invite. 
Gauging the plausibility of mosaic claims will never be an exact science, but by 
cabining them with reasonable requirements of proof and by matching 
speculativeness with skepticism, courts can at least weed out the most spurious 
assertions. 
 
presented to them by the parties, who have the information and incentive to alert the court 
to all relevant ones. Government agencies have typically presented one mosaic claim per 
case; it is conceivable, though, that an agency could present multiple different mosaics, with 
an explanation of and risk assessment for each. So long as at least one of these mosaics 
meets the standards for exemption, withholding would be appropriate. More problematic 
would be a case in which none of the proffered mosaic claims meets the minimal standards 
for exemption, but taken together—their magnitude-times-probability sum aggregated in 
some way—the threat posed by all the mosaics appears nontrivial. In such a scenario, I 
would favor disclosure. FOIA’s bar for meeting the national security exemption is already 
low: Agencies’ arguments need not be convincing so much as plausible. See supra Subsection 
I.A.2. Allowing agencies to aggregate mosaic claims in this way would eviscerate FOIA’s 
already minimalist plausibility constraint, and it would invite opportunism by encouraging 
agencies to make as many different mosaic claims as possible, no matter how weak. 
221.  See supra note 204 and accompanying text. 
222.  115 F.R.D. 63, 65 & n.7 (D.D.C. 1987); see supra notes 76-78 and accompanying text. 
223.  Gerstein v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, slip op. at 19-21 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 30, 2005); see supra notes 
134-142 and accompanying text. 
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Courts should, moreover, consider positive mosaic scenarios as well as 
negative ones—the public too can mosaic-make, and thereby respond more 
intelligently to threats. If FOIA disclosures inform a community of its critical 
infrastructure vulnerabilities, for example, its residents may be able to devise 
better protection schemes and lobby for their implementation (or, if still 
unsatisfied, to relocate). Plaintiffs should have the opportunity to present such 
positive scenarios and to rebut the government’s mosaic claims.224 Likewise, 
courts should consider not only the ways in which information technologies 
can facilitate adversarial mosaic-making, but also the ways in which they can 
help combat such activity. Data-mining technologies may allow agencies to 
search their own records more easily and more powerfully for possible mosaics, 
reducing their compliance burden as well as enabling more precise arguments 
about how threatening mosaics could be constructed. If the information in 
dispute is being requested in electronic form, courts may want to consider 
releasing only hard copies or encrypted versions rather than denying all 
disclosure out of mosaic theory concerns. 
The above suggestions operate within the current framework of FOIA 
review.225 A somewhat more radical measure could further invigorate judicial 
oversight of mosaic claims: allowing courts to utilize extrajudicial assistants 
such as special masters when confronted with difficult mosaic arguments.226 
While Chief Judge of the D.C. Circuit, Patricia Wald observed that “judges 
often feel inadequate or incompetent to address either the factual predicates or 
the policy judgments involved in executive claims of national security.”227 
 
224.  Plaintiffs have traditionally not had this opportunity in FOIA national security appeals. 
FOIA courts have accorded “little or no weight to opinions of persons other than the agency 
classification authority when reviewing the propriety of agency classification 
determinations.” DOJ FOIA GUIDE, supra note 9, at 153. Some scholars have argued, 
unsuccessfully, that FOIA courts should weigh the public interest in disclosure against the 
risk to national security. See, e.g., MOYNIHAN, supra note 211, at 217; Halstuk, supra note 36, 
at 132. I am not taking up that issue here, but am, rather, proposing a different type of 
balancing: Instead of weighing other public interests, such as democratic accountability, 
against increased national security risk from disclosure, I am advocating that FOIA courts 
weigh the expected (mosaic-based) reduction in national security risk against the expected 
increase from disclosure. The balancing calculus remains one of national security alone. 
225.  While FOIA itself could also be amended to clarify that mosaic claims should receive no 
special treatment, President Clinton already made essentially this clarification in his 
executive order on classification, and no courts seemed to find the provision helpful or even 
relevant. See supra notes 80-83 and accompanying text. 
226.  In at least one FOIA Exemption 1 case, a district court appointed a special master to review 
and categorize a large volume of classified records. Wash. Post v. U.S. Dep’t of Defense, 766 
F. Supp. 1, 4 (D.D.C. 1991). For a thoughtful discussion of the costs and benefits of 
employing such special masters in FOIA litigation, see Deyling, supra note 6, at 105-11. 
227.  Wald, supra note 17, at 760. 
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Judges also fear being responsible, and seen as responsible, for putting the 
country at risk.228 Highly speculative mosaic claims, being both particularly 
difficult to evaluate and particularly susceptible to abuse, exaggerate a judge’s 
dilemma. At the least, extrajudicial assistants could help with fact finding. 
More significantly, assistants with backgrounds in national security—for 
instance, intelligence agency retirees or officials on rotation, granted immunity 
and perhaps even anonymity—could help judges evaluate the plausibility of 
posited mosaics.229 Even if courts continue to weight agencies’ risk assessments 
above all other viewpoints, the existence of any special mechanism for dealing 
with mosaic claims might remind them that the theory is a likely vehicle for 
excessive secrecy, and that secrecy has real costs. 
conclusion 
For all the problems it generates, the mosaic theory, already entrenched 
through executive order, agency regulation, and judicial precedent, will remain 
a fixture in national security law. As it should. The theory’s basic premise is 
valid, if simple: Informational synergy does exist, and adversaries can capitalize 
on it to our detriment. Indeed, the only way adversaries can capitalize on 
information disclosure is through mosaic-making. As the Department of 
Justice noted in its CNSS brief, the mosaic theory “is principally an exercise of 
common sense.”230 The attacks of September 11 brutally affirmed the theory231 
and highlighted its increased valence in an age of information technology and 
nonconventional terrorism. Litigation arising out of the government’s response 
to the attacks, meanwhile, highlighted the theory’s pliability in justifying 
official secrecy across a great range of activities. 
This expanding role for the mosaic theory, and the continued willingness 
of some courts to delegate agencies’ mosaic claims, should give us pause. With 
mosaic decisions still coming down apace and government secrecy still on the 
 
228.  See Halstuk, supra note 36, at 131. Halstuk recommends a more radical measure than special 
assistants to invigorate FOIA review: a special Article III court, composed of federal judges 
with intelligence bona fides, for national security cases. Id. at 131-32. Halstuk’s judges would 
have their own special masters. Id. at 132. 
229.  Extrajudicial assistants would be especially valuable in this respect if provided access to 
government classifiers’ work. Yet given the absence of independent expert opinion in FOIA 
national security litigation, see supra note 224, extrajudicial assistants should improve the 
quality of decisionmaking with or without such access. 
230.  Brief for Appellant at 33, Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (No. 02-5254), available at http://www.cnss.org/CNSSbrief-final.pdf. 
231.  See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text. 
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rise, the stakes of mosaic theory jurisprudence are higher than ever. While 
judicial review in FOIA national security litigation has often been perfunctory, 
courts applying standard deference have at least helped check governmental 
abuse by demanding plausible arguments tailored to the specific documents 
withheld. The recent delegation and abdication cases, by contrast, stand for the 
proposition that mosaic risks are beyond courts’ ken; that categorical mosaic 
assertions can justify unprecedented acts of government secrecy; that judges 
should reject mosaic-based withholdings only when patently incredible. Highly 
speculative mosaic claims will always provide a challenge to a reviewing court, 
but delegation exacerbates the theory’s potential for misuse. It is hard to see in 
delegation much more than courts’ “acquiescence,”232 or to reconcile it with 
FOIA’s text and purpose. It is hard to miss in North Jersey Media’s abdication 
approach the acquiescence; the opinion flaunts it. Rather than have courts 
reward more speculative, more categorical, more extreme mosaic claims with 
additional deference, I advocate various tools for modulating mosaic theory 
review to conform as closely as possible to standard FOIA review. Most of 
these suggestions are tactical and would require from judges only vigilance. 
More radically, I also recommend the use of extrajudicial assistants such as 
special masters for difficult mosaic cases.  
In over thirty years of the theory’s existence, only one FOIA court on record 
has rejected a government agency’s mosaic defense. In theory, highly 
speculative mosaic claims are unfalsifiable; in practice, they have proven 
unimpeachable. That a model of reviewing them so undertheorized and so 
prone to misuse has, with minimal resistance, risen to such stature in national 
security information law is, I submit, remarkable. Heightened deference for 
mosaic claims may seem the safe move post-9/11, but courts should not forget 
mosaic-making’s ubiquity—or such deference’s own dangers. Maybe more 
than vigilance is required. 
 
232.  Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 940 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
